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Abstract
The two user multiple-input single-output (MISO) broadcast channel with confi-
dential messages (BCCM) is studied in which the nature of channel state informa-
tion at the transmitter (CSIT) from each user can be of the form Ii, i = 1, 2 where
I1, I2 ∈ {P,D,N}, and the forms P, D and N correspond to perfect and instantaneous,
completely delayed, and no CSIT, respectively. Thus, the overall CSIT can alternate
between 9 possible states corresponding to all possible values of I1I2, with each state
occurring for λI1I2 fraction of the total duration. The main contribution of this paper
is to establish the secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region of the MISO BCCM with
alternating CSIT with the symmetry assumption, where λI1I2 = λI2I1 .
The main technical contributions include developing a) novel achievable schemes
for MISO BCCM with alternating CSIT with security constraints which also highlight
the synergistic benefits of inter-state coding for secrecy, b) new converse proofs via
local statistical equivalence and channel enhancement; and c) showing the interplay
between various aspects of channel knowledge and their impact on s.d.o.f.
1 Introduction
Wireless systems are particularly vulnerable to security attacks because of the inherent open-
ness of the transmission medium. With the widespread adoption of multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) systems, there has been a significant recent interest in information theoretic
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 13-14733, CCF 14-22111, CCF 14-22129 and CCF 14-
22090, and presented in part at IEEE ISIT 2014 and to be presented in part at IEEE ICC 2015.
physical layer security, the main premise of which is to exploit the difference in the wireless
channels between different users. Information theoretic security has been investigated for a
variety of channel models ranging from fading channels [1–4], MIMO wiretap channels [5–8],
multiple access channels [9–13], multi-receiver wiretap channels [14–16], broadcast channels
with confidential messages [17–19], wiretap channels with helpers [20,21], interference chan-
nels with confidential messages [22–25], X-channels with confidential messages [26,27], relay
eavesdropper channels [28–32], etc.
The focus of this paper is on the secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region of the fading
two-user multiple-input single-output (MISO) broadcast channel with confidential messages
(BCCM), in which the transmitter with two antennas has two confidential messages, one
for each of the single antenna users (see Fig. 1). The secrecy capacity region of the MISO
broadcast channel for the case of perfect and instantaneous CSI at all terminals (transmitter
and the receivers) has been characterized in [18, 19]. Using these results, it follows that
for the two-user MISO BCCM, the sum s.d.o.f. is 2 with perfect and instantaneous channel
state information at the transmitter (CSIT). In practice, the assumption of perfect and
instantaneous CSIT may be too optimistic as CSIT may be delayed, imprecise or may not
even be available at all.
The impact of relaxing such assumptions on the d.o.f. (secure or otherwise) has been
widely studied in the literature. With perfect CSIT (P), the sum d.o.f. for the two-user
MISO broadcast channel is 2. With no CSIT (N) however, reference [33] showed that the
sum d.o.f.1 collapses to 1. With delayed2 CSIT (D), it is shown in [34] that the sum d.o.f. for
the two-user MISO BC increases to 4
3
. [34] also presents novel results for the more general
setting of K-user MISO BC, for K ≥ 2. With delayed CSI, [35] established the d.o.f. region
for the two-user MIMO BC. Other channel models besides the BC has also been investigated.
Reference [36] provided the d.o.f. region of the MIMO interference channel with delayed CSIT
and output feedback. For the X-channel, references [37, 38] showed that the optimal sum
d.o.f. is 4
3
with perfect channel knowledge. With delayed CSIT the optimal sum d.o.f. of
the X-channel remains unknown in general. However, with a restriction of the transmission
policies to linear schemes, reference [39] determined the sum d.o.f. of the channel to be 6
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(also see [40, 41] and the references therein). With global feedback, where each transmitter
receives output feedback from every receiver, [42] showed that the sum d.o.f. of the two-user
X-channel with delayed CSIT is the same as that of the two-user MISO broadcast channel
with 2 antennas at the transmitter; thus, all the transmitters can cooperate and behave like
a single 2-antenna MISO system, and the optimal sum d.o.f. is 4
3
.
1We refer to sum d.o.f. as the sum degrees of freedom for a network without any confidentiality constraints
(e.g., MISO BC); and sum s.d.o.f. as the sum secure degrees of freedom for the same network with confidential
messages (e.g., MISO BCCM).
2By delayed CSIT, we refer to the standard assumption as in [34] in which the delay in acquiring CSIT
is larger than the channel coherence time.
2
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Figure 1: MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCCM).
When security constraints are introduced, the s.d.o.f. is known for several scenarios of
delayed or no CSIT. For the two-user MISO BCCM with no CSIT, the sum s.d.o.f. is
zero as the two users are statistically equivalent and hence no secrecy is possible. On the
other hand, with completely outdated CSIT from both users, [43] showed that the sum
s.d.o.f. increases to 1. For the two-user SISO X-channel with confidential messages and
global output feedback, [44] showed that the optimal s.d.o.f. is 1; thus, two distributed
transmitters with one antenna each are as good as a single transmitter with 2 antennas and
the X-channel behaves like a two-user MISO BCCM. The aforementioned literature primarily
deals with homogeneous CSIT scenarios in which the nature of channel knowledge supplied
by every receiver is of the same form. In practice, however, the nature of CSIT can vary
across users. This observation naturally leads to the setting of heterogeneous (or hybrid)
CSIT which models the variability in the quality/delay of channel knowledge supplied by
different users. In contrast to homogeneous CSIT, the setting of heterogeneous CSIT is
much less understood. To the best of our knowledge, the complete characterization of the
d.o.f. of all fixed heterogeneous CSIT configurations is only known for the two-user MISO
broadcast channel: see [45, 46] for state PD for which the optimal sum d.o.f. is shown to be
3/2; and [47] which recently settled the states PN and DN through a novel converse proof
and showed that the optimal sum d.o.f. is given by 1. Beyond these results, partial results
are available for the three-user MISO BC with hybrid CSIT in [48, 49] but by and large the
problem of heterogeneous CSIT even without secrecy constraints remains open.
Besides exhibiting heterogeneity across users, the nature of channel knowledge may also
vary over time/frequency. Such variability can arise either naturally (due to the time varia-
tion in tolerable feedback overhead from a user) or it can be artificially induced (by deliber-
ately altering the channel feedback mechanism over time/frequency). For example, instead of
requiring perfect CSIT from one user and delayed CSIT from the other user throughout the
duration of communication, one may require that for half of the time, the first user provide
perfect CSIT while the second user provide delayed CSIT (state PD), and the roles of the
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users are reversed for the remaining half of the time (state DP), the total network feedback
overhead being the same in both cases. This leads naturally to the setting of alternating
CSIT in which multiple CSIT states, for instance, PD and DP in the above example, arise
over time. The alternating CSIT framework was introduced in [50] where the d.o.f. region
was characterized for the two-user MISO BC. It was shown that synergistic gains in d.o.f. are
possible by jointly coding across these states. It was observed in [50] for the two-user case
that the final d.o.f. region depends only on the marginal fractions of perfect, delayed and
no CSIT, that is, the fractions of the time a user provides perfect, delayed and no CSIT.
Given these results, several natural questions arise: a) do such synergistic gains still exist
with additional confidentiality constraints on the messages, b) if yes, what is the optimal
s.d.o.f. region and how to achieve it, c) what is the penalty for incorporating confidentiality
in contrast to [50] and d) the fundamental impact of the variability of channel knowledge on
secrecy.
In this paper, we consider the two-user MISO BCCM with alternating CSIT with all
9 possible CSIT states: PP, PD, PN, DP, NP, DD, DN, ND, and NN. We assume that
these states occur for arbitrary fractions of time, except for a mild condition of symmetry,
which is that states I1I2 and I2I1 occur for equal fractions of the time if I1 6= I2. The main
contribution of this paper is the characterization of the optimal s.d.o.f. region for this general
model3. With 9 states, each occurring for arbitrary fractions of the time, it is not immediately
clear how to optimally code across the states and the achievability of the s.d.o.f. region is
highly non-trivial. To this end, we first develop several key constituent schemes, where each
scheme uses a subset of the 9 states to achieve a particular s.d.o.f. value. We present all the
constituent schemes in Section 4. Now given an arbitrary4 probability mass function (pmf)
on the 9 CSIT states, we need to judiciously time share between the constituent schemes
to achieve the optimal s.d.o.f. region. It is not immediately clear how this should be done.
Thus, we consider different sub-cases based on the relative proportions of the various states
and explicitly characterize how the constituent schemes should be time shared to obtain the
optimal s.d.o.f. region in each sub-case. This characterization is done in Section 5.
Next, we provide a matching converse for the full region. We first generalize the local
statistical equivalence property introduced in [51]. The idea behind the converse is to first
enhance the channel by providing more CSIT to obtain a new channel with fewer number
of states but at least as large secrecy capacity as the original channel. Outer bounds on
the s.d.o.f. region for the enhanced channel give us the desired outer bounds for the original
channel.
Thus, the main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: a) We obtain
3In our preliminary work [51], we considered the problem with only two states, PD and DP and established
the optimal s.d.o.f. region for this specific problem. Reference [52] considered another special case with four
states: PP, PD, DP and DD, but provided only an inner bound for the s.d.o.f. region.
4Arbitrary subject to mild symmetry, i.e., λI1I2 = λI2I1
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the full s.d.o.f. region with all possible 9 states occurring for arbitrary fractions of time
constrained only by the requirement of symmetry, which is that states I1I2 and I2I1 occur
for equal fractions of the time if I1 6= I2. b) To achieve this region, we provide several
new optimal achievable schemes for different alternating CSIT scenarios. c) In addition, we
provide an explicit method of combining the various achievable schemes judiciously to achieve
the region. d) We provide a matching converse for the full region using channel enhancement
and generalizing the local statistical equivalence property introduced in [51]. e) We establish
the s.d.o.f. regions of the MISO BCCM under two heterogeneous CSIT settings: PD and DN
states alone. These results completely settle the problem of characterizing the s.d.o.f. regions
of all individual heterogenous CSIT states: PD, PN, DN. f) We show synergistic benefits of
coding across the different alternating states even under security constraints.
2 System Model
We consider a two-user MISO BC, shown in Fig. 1, where the transmitter Tx, equipped with
2 antennas, wishes to send independent confidential messages to two single antenna receivers
1 and 2. The input-output relations at time t are given by,
Y (t) = H1(t)X(t) +N1(t) (1)
Z(t) = H2(t)X(t) +N2(t), (2)
where Y (t) and Z(t) are the channel outputs of receivers 1 and 2, respectively. The 2 ×
1 channel input X(t) is power constrained as E[||X(t)||2] ≤ P , and N1(t) and N2(t) are
circularly symmetric complex white Gaussian noises with zero-mean and unit-variance. The
1 × 2 channel vectors H1(t) and H2(t) of receivers 1 and 2, respectively, are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with continuous distributions, and are also i.i.d. over
time. We denote H(t) = {H1(t),H2(t)} as the collective channel vectors at time t and
Hn = {H(1), . . . ,H(n)} as the sequence of channel vectors up until and including time n.
In practice, the receivers estimate the channel coefficients and feed them back to the
transmitter. In general, the receiver can choose to send not only the current measurements,
but rather any function of all the channel measurements it has taken upto that time. The
CSIT at time t can thus be any function of the measured channel coefficients upto time t.
There are two key aspects to the CSIT: precision and delay. Precision captures the fact that
the measurements made at the receivers and sent to the transmitter are imprecise (usually,
quantized) and noisy. Delay is introduced since making measurements and feeding them
back to the transmitter takes time. We will focus on the delay aspect of CSIT, and assume
that the CSIT when available, has infinite precision.
In order to model the delay in CSIT, we assume that at each time t, there are 3 possible
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CSIT states for each user:
• Perfect CSIT (P): This denotes the availability of precise and instantaneous CSI of a
user at the transmitter. In this state, the transmitter has precise channel knowledge
before the start of the communication.
• Delayed CSIT (D): In this state, the transmitter does not have the CSI at the beginning
of the communication. In slot t, the receiver may send any function of all the channel
coefficients upto and including time t as CSI to the transmitter. However, the CSIT
becomes available only after a delay such that the CSI is completely outdated, that is,
independent of the current channel realization.
• No CSIT (N): In this state, there is no CSI of the user available at the transmitter.
Denote the CSIT of user 1 by I1 and the CSIT of user 2 by I2. Then,
I1, I2 ∈ {P,D,N} . (3)
Thus, for the two-user MISO BC, we have 9 CSIT states, namely PP, DD, NN, PD, DP, PN,
NP, DN, and ND. Let λI1I2 be the fraction of the time the state I1I2 occurs. Then,
∑
I1,I2
λI1I2 = 1. (4)
We also assume symmetry: λI1I2 = λI2I1 for every I1I2. Specifically,
λPD = λDP (5)
λDN = λND (6)
λPN = λNP . (7)
Further, we assume that perfect and global CSI is available at both receivers.
A secure rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which satisfy
the reliability constraints at the receivers, namely, Pr
[
Wi 6= Wˆi
]
≤ ǫn, for i = 1, 2, and the
confidentiality constraints, namely,
1
n
I(W1;Z
n,Hn) ≤ ǫn,
1
n
I(W2; Y
n,Hn) ≤ ǫn, (8)
where ǫn → 0 as n → ∞. Informally, the constraints in (8) ensure that the information
leakage, per channel use, of the first receiver’s message at the second receiver should be
arbitrarily small, and vice versa. A s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2) is achievable, if there exists an
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achievable rate pair (R1, R2) such that
d1 = lim
P→∞
R1
logP
, d2 = lim
P→∞
R2
logP
. (9)
Let us define the following:
λP , λPP + λPD + λPN (10)
λD , λPD + λDD + λDN (11)
λN , λPN + λDN + λNN . (12)
Using these definitions, it is easy to verify that
λP + λD + λN = 1. (13)
Here, we can interpret these three quantities as follows:
• λP : represents the total fraction of time the CSIT of a user is in the P state.
• λD: represents the total fraction of time the CSIT of a user is delayed, that is, the
state D.
• λN : represents the total fraction of time a user supplies no CSIT.
Given the probability mass function (pmf), λI1I2, our goal is to characterize the s.d.o.f. re-
gion of the two-user MISO BCCM.
3 Main Result and Discussion
Theorem 1 The s.d.o.f. region for the two-user MISO BCCM with alternating CSIT, D(λI1I2),
is the set of all non-negative pairs (d1, d2) satisfying,
d1 ≤ min
(
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
, 1− λNN
)
(14)
d2 ≤ min
(
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
, 1− λNN
)
(15)
3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP (16)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP (17)
d1 + d2 ≤ 2(λP + λD). (18)
A proof for the achievability of this region will be provided in Section 5 using constituent
schemes presented in Section 4. A converse is provided in Section 6.
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Figure 2: The sum s.d.o.f. as a function of λP and λD.
We next make a series of remarks highlighting the consequences and interesting aspects
of this theorem.
Remark 1. [Sum s.d.o.f.: max(d1 + d2)]
From the region stated in (14)-(18), it is clear that the sum s.d.o.f. is given by,
sum s.d.o.f. = min
(
2
(
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
)
, 2(1− λNN), 2(λP + λD), 1 + λP
)
. (19)
The sum s.d.o.f. expression in (19) can be significantly simplified by noting that the first
two terms in the minimum are inactive due to the inequalities 1 + λP ≤ 2
(
2+2λP−λPP
3
)
, and
2(λP + λD) = 2(1 − λN) ≤ 2(1 − λNN). These inequalities follow directly from (10)-(13).
Using these inequalities, the sum s.d.o.f. expression above is equivalent to
sum s.d.o.f. = min (2(λP + λD), 1 + λP ) (20)
= min (2(λP + λD), 2λP + λD + λN ) (21)
= 2λP + λD +min(λD, λN). (22)
Fig. 2 shows the sum s.d.o.f. as a function of λP and λD.
Remark 2. [Same marginals property]
From (22), we notice that the marginal probabilities λP , λD and λN are sufficient to determine
the sum s.d.o.f. Thus, for any given pmf λI1I2, satisfying the symmetry conditions (5)-(7),
there exists an equivalent alternating CSIT problem having only three states: PP, DD and
NN occurring for λP , λD and λN fractions of the time, respectively, that has the same sum
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D
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Figure 3: Trade-off between delayed and perfect CSIT.
s.d.o.f. This observation is similar to the case when there is no secrecy [50]. However unlike
in [50], the s.d.o.f. region does not have the same property in general as we can see the
explicit dependence of the s.d.o.f. region in (14)-(18) on λPP and λNN .
Remark 3. [Channel knowledge equivalence]
We next highlight an interesting property which shows that from the sum s.d.o.f. perspective,
no CSIT is equivalent to delayed CSIT when λD ≥ λN , and delayed CSIT is equivalent to
perfect CSIT when λD < λN .
Equivalence of delayed and no CSIT when λD ≥ λN : From a sum s.d.o.f. perspective, we
see that when λD ≥ λN , the sum s.d.o.f. depends only on λP . Hence, as long as λD ≥ λN
holds, the N states behave as D states in the sense that, if the N states were enhanced to D
states, the sum s.d.o.f. would not increase. Essentially, the N states can be combined with
various D states and we obtain the same sum s.d.o.f. as if every N state were replaced by
a D state. Consider an example, where the states PD, DP and NN occur for 2
5
th, 2
5
th and
1
5
th fractions of the time, respectively. Note that λD =
2
5
> λN =
1
5
in this case. The sum
s.d.o.f., from (22), is 2λP + λD + λN =
7
5
. Now, if we enhance the N states to D states, we
get the states PD, DP and DD occur for 2
5
th, 2
5
th and 1
5
th of the time, respectively. The sum
s.d.o.f. of this enhanced system is still 7
5
.
Equivalence of delayed and perfect CSIT when λD ≤ λN : From a sum s.d.o.f. perspective,
we see that when λD ≤ λN , the sum s.d.o.f. depends only on λN . Hence, in this case, if
λD ≤ λN , the delayed CSIT is as good as perfect CSIT, that is, every D state can be enhanced
to a P state without any increase in the sum s.d.o.f. For example, consider a system where
the states PD, DP and NN occur for 1
5
th, 1
5
th and 3
5
th fractions of the time, respectively.
Note that λD =
1
5
< λN =
3
5
in this case. The sum s.d.o.f. for this system is 4
5
, from (22). By
enhancing the D states to P states, we get a system, where the states PP and NN occur for
2
5
th and 3
5
th fractions of the time, respectively. The sum s.d.o.f. in for this enhanced system
9
is still 4
5
.
Remark 4. [Minimum CSIT required for a sum s.d.o.f. value]
Fig. 3 shows the trade-off between λP and λD for a given value of sum s.d.o.f. The highlighted
corner point in each curve shows the most efficient point in terms of CSIT requirement.
Any other feasible point either involves redundant CSIT or unnecessary instantaneous CSIT
where delayed CSIT would have sufficed. For example, following are the minimum CSIT
requirements for various sum s.d.o.f. values:
sum s.d.o.f. = 2 : (λP , λD)min = (1, 0) (23)
sum s.d.o.f. =
3
2
: (λP , λD)min =
(
1
2
,
1
4
)
(24)
sum s.d.o.f. =
4
3
: (λP , λD)min =
(
1
3
,
1
3
)
(25)
sum s.d.o.f. = 1 : (λP , λD)min =
(
0,
1
2
)
. (26)
In general, for a given value of sum s.d.o.f. = s, the minimum CSIT requirements are given
by:
(λP , λD)min =


(
s− 1, 1− s
2
)
, if 1 ≤ s ≤ 2(
0, s
2
)
, if 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
(27)
Remark 5. [Cost of security]
We recall that in the case with no security [50], the sum d.o.f. is given by,
sum d.o.f. = 2−
2λN
3
−
max(λN , 2λD)
3
. (28)
Comparing with (22), we see that the loss in d.o.f. that must be incurred to incorporate
secrecy constraints is given by,
(sum d.o.f.)− (sum s.d.o.f.) , loss =


λN , if λN ≥ 2λD
2
3
(2λN − λD), if 2λD ≥ λN ≥ λD
1
3
(λN + λD), if λD ≥ λN .
(29)
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λD+λN
2
3
(λD + λN)
1
3
(λD + λN)
1
3
1
2
1
loss
λD + λN
0
Figure 4: Cost of security.
If we define α = λD/(λD + λN), we can rewrite (29) as follows,
loss = (λD + λN)×


(1− α), if α ≤ 1
3(
4
3
− 2α
)
, if 1
2
≥ α ≥ 1
3
1
3
, if α ≥ 1
2
.
(30)
We show this loss as a function of α in Fig. 4. Note that λD + λN is the fraction of the
time a user feeds back imperfect (delayed or none) CSIT. If this fraction is fixed, increasing
the fraction of the delayed CSIT decreases the penalty due to the security constraints, but
only to a certain extent. When λN ≥ λD, increasing the fraction of delayed CSIT leads
to a decrease in the penalty due to the security constraints. However, once the fraction of
the delayed CSIT (state D) matches that of no CSIT (N), that is, λD ≥ λN , increasing the
fraction of delayed CSIT further does not reduce the penalty any more.
Remark 6. [S.d.o.f. characterization of individual CSIT states]
As an additional relevant result, we also characterize the respective s.d.o.f. regions for the
6 individual CSIT states. To the best of our knowledge, the only CSIT states for which
the s.d.o.f. regions were previously known are: PP (with sum s.d.o.f.= 2), DD (with sum
s.d.o.f.= 1), PN (with s.d.o.f.= 1), and NN (with s.d.o.f.= 0). For the remaining two CSIT
states, i.e., PD and DN, we establish the optimal s.d.o.f. regions. In particular, for the PD
CSIT state, we show in Appendix D that the s.d.o.f. region is given by d1 + d2 ≤ 1. For the
DN state, we show in Appendix E that the s.d.o.f. region is given by d1 + d2 ≤ 1/2. As the
next remark shows, these complete set of results for the individual CSIT states confirm the
synergistic benefits (or lack thereof) in various alternating CSIT scenarios.
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Remark 7. [Synergistic benefits]
It was shown in [50] that by coding across different states one can achieve higher sum
d.o.f. than by optimal encoding for each state separately and time sharing. A similar result
holds true in our case as well. We illustrate this with the help of a few examples.
Example 1. Consider a special case where only states PD and DP occur, each for half of
the time. In our previous work, [51], we showed that optimal sum s.d.o.f. is 3
2
in this case;
see also (22) here. The best achievable scheme for the PD (or DP) state alone was known to
achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of 1. This was either by treating the PD state as a PN state and zero
forcing, or by treating PD as a DD state. However a converse proof showing the optimality
of 1 sum s.d.o.f. was not known. In Appendix D, we present a converse proof to show that
the sum s.d.o.f. of 1 is indeed optimal for the PD state alone. Thus, by encoding for each
state separately and time sharing between the PD and DP states, we can achieve only 1 sum
s.d.o.f., whereas joint encoding across the states achieves sum s.d.o.f. of 3
2
. Thus, we have
synergistic benefit of 50% in this case.
Example 2. Consider another special case with three states: PD, DP and NN each
occurring for one-third of the time. The optimal sum s.d.o.f. is 4
3
. If we encode for each state
separately and time share between them, we can achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of 1
3
×1+ 1
3
×1+ 1
3
×0 =
2
3
, since the NN state does not provide any secrecy. If we encode across the PD and DP states
optimally and then time share with the NN state, we can achieve 2
3
× 3
2
+ 1
3
×0 = 1 sum s.d.o.f.
Thus, in this case too, we get synergistic benefit by coding across all the states together.
Example 3. Now, assume we have the following three states: PN, NP and DD each
occurring for one-third of the time. The optimal sum s.d.o.f. for this case is 4
3
. On the other
hand, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the PN state alone is 1, [47], and that of the DD state alone
is also 1, [43]. Thus, by separately encoding for each state and time sharing, we can achieve
1
3
× 1 + 1
3
× 1 + 1
3
× 1 = 1 sum s.d.o.f. Note that the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for PN and NP
states, each occurring for half of the time, is also 1, using (22). Thus, by optimal encoding
for PN and NP together and time sharing with the DD state also yields sum s.d.o.f. of 1.
Therefore, there is synergistic benefit to be gained by coding across all the states together
in this case too.
Example 4. Consider the case where the two states, DD and NN occur for equal fractions
of time. The optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the DD state alone is 1 [43]. The NN state, by itself
does not provide any secrecy and its s.d.o.f. = 0. Thus, by encoding for the individual states
and time sharing, at most 1 × 1
2
+ 0 × 1
2
= 1
2
sum s.d.o.f. is achievable. However, by jointly
encoding across both the DD and NN states, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of 1 is achievable. Thus,
we have synergistic benefit of 100% in terms of sum s.d.o.f. in this case.
Example 5. Finally, consider the case where the two states, DN and ND occur for equal
fractions of time. We show in Appendix E that the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for DN state is 1
2
.
Thus, by separately encoding across the individual states, only 1
2
sum s.d.o.f. is achievable.
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However, by jointly encoding across both the DN and DN states, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of
1 is achievable. Thus, we have synergistic benefit of 100% in terms of sum s.d.o.f. in this
case.
Remark 7. [Lack of synergistic benefits]
There are some situations where joint encoding across alternating states does not yield any
benefit in terms of the s.d.o.f. region. For example, consider a case with only 2 states, PN
and NP, each occurring for half of the time. The optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the PN state alone
is 1, which is achieved by zero forcing. The optimal sum s.d.o.f. of both PN and NP states
together is also 1; thus, encoding for each state separately is optimal in this case. Indeed
separable encoding for each individual state suffices to achieve the full s.d.o.f. region as well.
This result is perhaps surprising, since in the case with no security, we do get synergistic
benefits of joint encoding across the PN and NP states. The optimal sum s.d.o.f. with joint
encoding is 3
2
, while that for each state alone is 1, [50].
4 Constituent Schemes
Summary of Constituent Schemes (CS)
Sum s.d.o.f. CS Notation CSIT States Fractions of States (d1, d2)
2 S2 PP 1 (1, 1)
3/2
S
3/2
1 PD, DP
(
1
2,
1
2
) (
3
4,
3
4
)
S
3/2
2 PD, DP, PN,NP
(
1
4 ,
1
4,
1
4,
1
4
) (
3
4,
3
4
)
4/3
S
4/3
1 PD,DP,NN
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) (
2
3
, 2
3
)
S
4/3
2 PN,NP,DD
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) (
2
3
, 2
3
)
1
S11 DD 1
(
1
2,
1
2
)
S12 DD,NN
(
1
2,
1
2
) (
1
2,
1
2
)
S13 DN,ND
(
1
2,
1
2
) (
1
2,
1
2
)
2/3
S
2/3
1 DD 1
(
2
3
, 0
)
S
2/3
2 DD,NN
(
2
3
, 1
3
) (
2
3
, 0
)
S
2/3
3 DN,ND,NN
(
1
3,
1
3,
1
3
) (
2
3 , 0
)
Table 1: Constituent schemes.
Before we present the achievability of the s.d.o.f. region, we first present the key con-
stituent schemes that will be instrumental in the proof. We combine these schemes carefully
13
and time share between them to achieve the s.d.o.f. region. A summary of these constituent
schemes is shown in Table 1. Before we discuss the individual schemes we make the following
remark that applies to all the schemes presented here.
4.1 A Note on the Achievable Security Guarantee
Each scheme described in the following sections can be outlined as follows. We neglect the
impact of noise at high SNR. Then, to achieve a certain s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2), we send n1
symbols u = (u1, . . . , un1) and n2 symbols v = (v1, . . . , vn2) intended for the first and second
receivers, respectively, in nB slots, such that d1 = n1/nB and d2 = n2/nB. Finally, we argue
that the leakage of information symbols at the unintended receiver is o(logP ). We however
want a stronger guarantee of security, namely,
1
n
I(W1;Z
n,Hn) ≤ ǫn,
1
n
I(W2; Y
n,Hn) ≤ ǫn. (31)
To achieve this, we view the nB slots described in the scheme as a block and treat the
equivalent channel from u to (Y,H) and (Z,H) as a memoryless wiretap channel (with
(Y,H) being the legitimate receiver) by ignoring the CSI of the previous block. We do the
same for the channel from v to (Z,H) and (Y,H) (with (Z,H) as the legitimate receiver).
Note also that no information about H is used to create the codebooks for u and v in any
of the schemes. More formally, the following secrecy rate pair is achievable for receivers 1
and 2, respectively, from [53]:
R1 =I(u;Y,H)− I(v;Z,H) = I(u;Y|H)− I(v;Z|H) (32)
R2 =I(v;Z,H)− I(u;Y,H) = I(v;Z|H)− I(u;Y|H), (33)
where we noted that u and v are all independent of H. Using the proposed scheme, u (resp.,
v) can be reconstructed from (Y,H) (resp., (Z,H)) to within a noise distortion. Thus,
I(u;Y|H) =n1 logP + o(logP ) (34)
I(v;Z|H) =n2 logP + o(logP ). (35)
Also, for each scheme,
I(v;Y|H) =o(logP ) (36)
I(u;Z|H) =o(logP ). (37)
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Thus, from (32) and (33), the achievable secure rates in each block are,
R1 =n1 logP + o(logP ) (38)
R2 =n2 logP + o(logP ). (39)
Since our block contains nB channel uses, the effective secure rates are
R1 =
n1
nB
logP + o(logP ) (40)
R2 =
n2
nB
logP + o(logP ). (41)
These rates clearly yield the required s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2), while also conforming to our
stringent security requirement.
In the following subsections, we now present the achievability of each scheme in detail.
Notation: A particular sum s.d.o.f. value can be achieved in various ways through al-
ternation between different possible sets of CSIT states. To this end, we use the following
notation: if there are r schemes achieving a particular s.d.o.f. value, we denote these schemes
as: Ssum s.d.o.f.1 , S
sum s.d.o.f.
2 , . . . , S
sum s.d.o.f.
r . For example, in Table 1, for achieving the sum
s.d.o.f. value of 1, we present r = 3 distinct schemes and these are denoted as S11 , S
1
2 and S
1
3 .
Given a 1×2 channel vector H(t), we denote by H(t)⊥, a 2×1 beamforming vector that
is orthogonal to the 1× 2 channel vector H(t); in other words, H(t)H(t)⊥ = 0.
4.2 Scheme Achieving Sum s.d.o.f. of 2
A sum s.d.o.f. of 2 is achievable only in the state PP, that is, when the transmitter has
perfect CSIT from both users. This is achievable using zero-forcing. The following scheme
achieves a sum s.d.o.f. of 2.
4.2.1 Scheme S2
The scheme S2 uses the state PP and achieves the rate pair (d1, d2) = (1, 1). The scheme is
as follows. We wish to send confidential symbols u and v to receivers 1 and 2, respectively,
in one time slot, thus achieving a sum s.d.o.f. of 2. Since the transmitter knows both channel
coefficients H1 and H2, it sends,
X = uH⊥2 + vH
⊥
1 , (42)
where, Hi(t)
⊥ is a 2 × 1 beamforming vector that is orthogonal to the 1× 2 channel vector
Hi(t) for i = 1, 2. This is to ensure that the symbols do not leak to unintended receivers.
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For s.d.o.f. calculations, we disregard the additive noise and the outputs at the receivers are:
Y =uH1H
⊥
2 (43)
Z =vH2H
⊥
1 , (44)
which allows both receivers to decode their respective messages. Also, since u does not
appear at all in Z, the confidentiality of u is guaranteed. Similarly, the confidentiality of v
too is satisfied.
4.3 Schemes Achieving Sum s.d.o.f. of 3/2
The following schemes achieve 3
2
sum s.d.o.f.:
4.3.1 Scheme S
3/2
1
In this subsection, we present the scheme S
3/2
1 which uses the states (PD,DP) with fractions
(1
2
, 1
2
) to achieve rate pair (d1, d2) = (
3
4
, 3
4
).
This scheme was presented in [51]. For the sake of completeness we reproduce the scheme
here. We wish to send 3 confidential symbols from the transmitter to each of the receivers
in 4 channel uses at high P (that is negligible noise). Let us denote by (u1, u2, u3) and
(v1, v2, v3) the confidential symbols intended for receivers 1 and 2, respectively. Also, in 2
of the 4 channel uses, the channel is in state PD; in the remaining 2 uses, the channel is in
state DP. The scheme is as follows:
1) At time t = 1, S(1) = PD: As the transmitter knows H1(1), it sends:
X(1) = [u1 0]
T + qH1(1)
⊥, (45)
where H1(1)H1(1)
⊥ = 0, and q denotes an artificial noise distributed as CN (0, P ). Here
H1(1)
⊥ is a 2 × 1 beamforming vector orthogonal to the 1 × 2 channel vector H1(1) of
receiver 1 that ensures that the artificial noise q does not create interference at receiver 1.
The receivers’ outputs are:
Y (1) = h11(1)u1 (46)
Z(1) = h21(1)u1 + qH2(1)H1(1)
⊥ ∆= K. (47)
Thus, receiver 1 has observed u1 while receiver 2 gets a linear combination of u1 and q, which
we denote as K. Due to delayed CSIT from receiver 2, the transmitter can reconstruct K
in the next channel use and use it for transmission.
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2) At time t = 2, S(2) = DP: The transmitter knows H2(2) and K. It sends
X(2) = [v1 +K v2 +K]
T + u2H2(2)
⊥. (48)
The received signals are:
Y (2) = h11(2)v1 + h12(2)v2 + (h11(2) + h12(2))K + u2H1(2)H2(2)
⊥ (49)
=L1(v1, v2, K) + u2H1(2)H2(2)
⊥ (50)
Z(2) = h21(2)v1 + h22(2)v2 + (h21(2) + h22(2))K (51)
∆
=L2(v1, v2, K), (52)
where we have defined L1(v1, v2, K) and L2(v1, v2, K) as linear combinations of v1, v2 and K
at receivers 1 and 2, respectively.
3) At time t = 3, S(3) = DP: The transmitter knowsH2(3) and L1(v1, v2, K) (via delayed
CSIT from t = 2). Using these, it transmits:
X(3) = [L1(v1, v2, K) 0]
T + u3H2(3)
⊥, (53)
and the channel outputs are:
Y (3) = h11(3)L1(v1, v2, K) + u3H1(3)H2(3)
⊥ (54)
Z(3) = h21(3)L1(v1, v2, K). (55)
At the end of this step, note that, receiver 2 can decode v1 and v2 by first eliminating K
using Z(1) and Z(3) to get a linear combination of v1 and v2, which it can then use with
Z(2) to solve for v1 and v2.
4) At time t = 4, S(4) = PD: The transmitter knows H1(4) and it sends
X(4) = [L1(v1, v2, K) 0]
T + v3H1(4)
⊥, (56)
and the channel outputs are:
Y (4) = h11(4)L1(v1, v2, K) (57)
Z(4) = h21(4)L1(v1, v2, K) + v3H2(4)H1(4)
⊥. (58)
Thus, at the end of these four steps the outputs at the two receivers can be summarized
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Tx
H1(t)
H2(t)
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
u1
! K
State PD DP DP PD
decode (v1, v2, v3)
decode (u1, u2, u3)
CSIT
βL1(v1, v2,K) + v3
α1L1(v1, v2,K) + u2 α2L1(v1, v2,K) + u3 L1(v1, v2,K)
L2(v1, v2,K) L1(v1, v2,K)
L(u1, q)
Figure 5: Achieving 3
2
s.d.o.f. using scheme S
3/2
1 .
(see Fig. 5) as:
Y=


u1
α1L1(v1, v2, K) + u2
α2L1(v1, v2, K) + u3
L1(v1, v2, K)

 , Z=


K
L2(v1, v2, K)
L1(v1, v2, K)
βL1(v1, v2, K)+v3

 .
Using Y, receiver 1 can decode all three symbols (u1, u2, u3) and using Z, receiver 2 can
decode (v1, v2, v3). Next we prove that the information leakage is only o(logP ).
Security guarantees :
We consider the four slots as a single block and the equivalent channel from u =
(u1, u2, u3) to (Y,H) and (Z,H) as a memoryless channel by ignoring the CSI of the previous
block. We do the same for the channel from v = (v1, v2, v3) to (Y,H) and (Z,H). Recall
that all the random variables {ui, vi, i = 1, 2, 3} and q are independent and distributed as
CN (0, P ).
First, let us consider the confidentiality of the first user’s symbols u. The information
leakage at user 2 is:
I(u;Z|H) =I(u1, u2, u3;Z|H) (59)
=I(u1;Z|H) (60)
≤I(u1;K|H) (61)
=I(u1; h21(1)u1 + qH2(1)H1(1)
⊥|H) (62)
=h(h21(1)u1 + qH2(1)H1(1)
⊥|H)− h(h21(1)u1 + qH2(1)H1(1)
⊥|u1,H) (63)
=h(h21(1)u1 + qH2(1)H1(1)
⊥|H)− h(qH2(1)H1(1)
⊥|H) (64)
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=(logP + o(logP ))− (logP + o(logP )) (65)
=o(logP ), (66)
where (60) follows from the fact that Z does not have any term involving (u2, u3), and (61)
follows from the Markov chain u1 → K → Z.
For the second user’s symbols, the information leakage at the first receiver is:
I(v;Y|H) =I(v1, v2, v3;Y|H) (67)
=I(v1, v2;Y|H) (68)
≤I(v1, v2;L1(v1, v2, K)|H) (69)
=h(L1(v1, v2, K)|H)− h(L1(v1, v2, K)|v1, v2,H) (70)
≤ logP − h(K|v1, v2,H) + o(logP ) (71)
= logP − h(K|H) + o(logP ) (72)
= logP − logP + o(logP ) (73)
=o(logP ), (74)
where (68) follows since v3 does not appear in Y and (69) follows from the Markov chain
(v1, v2)→ L1(v1, v2, K)→ Y.
4.3.2 Scheme S
3/2
2
In this sub-section, we present the scheme S
3/2
2 which uses the states (PD,DP,PN,NP) with
fractions (1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
) to achieve (d1, d2) = (
3
4
, 3
4
).
Let us consider the utilization of CSIT in the scheme S
3/2
1 stated above. In the first slot,
delayed CSIT is required from the second user, since that knowledge allows the transmitter
to reconstruct K and use it in the second slot. Similarly, in the second time slot, delayed
CSIT from the first user is required so that the transmitter can reconstruct L1(v1, v2, K) to
transmit in the third and fourth slots. However, in the third and fourth slots, the transmitter
does not require any CSIT of the first and second users, respectively. Thus, the same scheme
works with PN and NP states in the last two slots. Since it is essentially the same scheme
interpreted in a different way, the security of the scheme follows from that of S
3/2
1 .
4.4 Schemes Achieving Sum s.d.o.f. of 4/3
4.4.1 Scheme S
4/3
1
In this sub-section, we present the scheme S
4/3
1 which uses the states (PD,DP,NN) for frac-
tions (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) to achieve s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2) = (
2
3
, 2
3
).
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Tx
H1(t)
H2(t)
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
u1
! K
State PD DPCSIT
α1L1(v1, v2,K) + u2 L1(v1, v2,K)
L2(v1, v2,K)
L(u1, q)
L1(v1, v2,K)
decode u1, u2
decode v1, v2
NN
Figure 6: Achieving sum s.d.o.f. of 4
3
using S
4/3
1 .
We wish to send 2 symbols to each user in 3 time slots. Let (u1, u2) and (v1, v2) be the
symbols intended for the first and second users, respectively. Fig. 6 shows the scheme. It is
as follows:
1) At time t = 1, S(1) = PD: As the transmitter knows H1(1), it sends:
X(1) = [u1 0]
T + qH1(1)
⊥, (75)
where H1(1)H1(1)
⊥ = 0, and q denotes an artificial noise distributed as CN (0, P ). Here
H1(1)
⊥ is a 2× 1 beamforming vector that ensures that the artificial noise q does not create
interference at receiver 1. The receivers’ outputs are:
Y (1) = h11(1)u1 (76)
Z(1) = h21(1)u1 + qH2(1)H1(1)
⊥ ∆= K. (77)
Thus, receiver 1 has observed u1 while receiver 2 gets a linear combination of u1 and q, which
we denote as K. Due to delayed CSIT from receiver 2, the transmitter can reconstruct K
in the next channel use and use it for transmission.
2) At time t = 2, S(2) = DP: The transmitter knows H2(2) and K. It sends
X(2) = [v1 +K v2 +K]
T + u2H2(2)
⊥. (78)
The received signals are:
Y (2) = h11(2)v1 + h12(2)v2 + (h11(2) + h12(2))K + u2H1(2)H2(2)
⊥ (79)
=L1(v1, v2, K) + u2H1(2)H2(2)
⊥ (80)
Z(2) = h21(2)v1 + h22(2)v2 + (h21(2) + h22(2))K
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∆
=L2(v1, v2, K), (81)
where we have defined L1(v1, v2, K) and L2(v1, v2, K) as independent linear combinations of
v1, v2 and K at receivers 1 and 2, respectively.
3) At time t = 3, S(3) = NN: The transmitter transmits:
X(3) = [L1(v1, v2, K) 0]
T . (82)
The receivers get:
Y (3) =h11(3)L1(v1, v2, K) (83)
Z(3) =h21(3)L1(v1, v2, K). (84)
At the end of three slots, therefore, the received outputs can be summarized as:
Y =


u1
α1L1(v1, v2, K) + u2
L1(v1, v2, K)

 , Z =


K
L2(v1, v2, K)
L1(v1, v2, K)

 .
Using Y, receiver 1 can decode (u1, u2), while receiver 2 can decode (v1, v2) using Z. The
information leakage is only o(logP ) as we show next.
Security guarantees :
The equivocation calculation follows similar to that of the scheme S
3/2
1 . For the first
user’s symbols u = (u1, u2), we have,
I(u;Z|H) =I(u1, u2;Z|H) (85)
=I(u1;Z|H) (86)
≤I(u1;K|H) (87)
=o(logP ), (88)
where (86) follows from the fact that Z does not have any term involving u2, and (87) follows
from the Markov chain u1 → K → Z.
For the second user’s symbols, the information leakage at the first receiver is:
I(v;Y|H) ≤I(v1, v2;L1(v1, v2, K)|H) (89)
=h(L1(v1, v2, K)|H)− h(L1(v1, v2, K)|v1, v2,H) (90)
≤ logP − h(K|v1, v2,H) + o(logP ) (91)
= logP − h(K|H) + o(logP ) (92)
= logP − logP + o(logP ) (93)
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Tx
H1(t)
H2(t)
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
StateCSIT
K1
K2
DD PNNPDD
L1(u,K1) +G1(v,K2)
L2(u,K1) +G2(v,K2)
PN NP
G1(v,K2)
L3(u) +G1(v,K2) L2(u,K1)
L2(u,K1) +G3(v)
G1(v,K2)
G1(v,K2) +G4(v) L2(u,K1)
L2(u,K1) + L4(u)
decode u = (u1, u2, u3, u4)
decode v = (v1, v2, v3, v4)
t = 4 t = 5 t = 6
Figure 7: Achieving sum s.d.o.f. 4
3
using S
4/3
2 .
=o(logP ), (94)
where (89) follows from the Markov chain (v1, v2)→ L1(v1, v2, K)→ Y.
4.4.2 Scheme S
4/3
2
We now present the scheme S
4/3
2 which uses the states PN,NP,DD with fractions (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) to
achieve (d1, d2) = (
2
3
, 2
3
).
In this case we will send 4 symbols to each user in 6 time slots. Let u = (u1, u2, u3, u4)
and v = (v1, v2, v3, v4) be the symbols intended for the first and second users, respectively.
Fig. 7 shows the scheme. It is as follows:
1) At time t = 1, S(1) = DD: In this slot, the transmitter sends artificial noise symbols
to create keys that can be used in later slots. The channel input is
X(1) = [q1 q2]
T , (95)
where q1 and q2 are i.i.d. as CN (0, P ). The received signals are:
Y (1) =h11(1)q1 + h12(1)q2
∆
= K1 (96)
Z(1) =h21(1)q1 + h22(1)q2
∆
= K2. (97)
Due to delayed CSIT, the transmitter learns K1 and K2 and uses them in the next time
slots.
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2) At time t = 2, S(2) = DD: In this slot, the transmitter sends:
X(2) = [u1 + u2 + v3 + v4 +K1 v1 + v2 + u3 + u4 +K2]
T . (98)
The received signals are:
Y (2) = h11(2)(u1 + u2 + v3 + v4 +K1) + h12(2)(v1 + v2 + u3 + u4 +K2) (99)
∆
= L1(u, K1) +G1(v, K2) (100)
Z(2) = h21(2)(u1 + u2 + v3 + v4 +K1) + h22(2)(v1 + v2 + u3 + u4 +K2) (101)
∆
= L2(u, K1) +G2(v, K2). (102)
Note that since K1 (or K2) is known at the first (or second) receiver, it can be removed.
The unintended symbols remain buried in the artificial noise, ensuring security. Also, if G1
(or L2) could be sent to the second (or first) receiver, it would provide a linear combination
of the intended symbols that is linearly independent of G2 (or L1). This is what we will do
in the third and fourth time slots.
3) At time t = 3, S(3) = NP: In this state, the transmitter knows H2 perfectly. It sends,
X(3) = [G1(v, K2) 0]
T + L3(u)H2(3)
⊥, (103)
where L3 is linearly independent of both L1 and L2. The received signals are:
Y (3) =h11(3)G1(v, K2) + L3(u)H1(3)H2(3)
⊥ (104)
Z(3) =h21(3)G1(v, K2). (105)
4) At time t = 4, S(4) = PN: In this state, the transmitter knows H1(4) perfectly. It
sends,
X(4) = [L2(u, K1) 0]
T +G3(v)H1(4)
⊥, (106)
where G3 is linearly independent of both G1 and G2. The received signals are:
Y (4) =h11(4)L2(u, K1) (107)
Z(4) =h21(4)L2(u, K1) +G3(v)H2(4)H1(4)
⊥. (108)
Now note that if we could supply G1 and L2 to the first and second receivers, respectively,
both receivers will end up with 3 linearly independent combinations of their intended sym-
bols. Thus, in the next two slots, the transmitter will supply G1 and L2 to the first and
second receivers, respectively, as well as send one more linearly independent combination of
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the intended information symbols to each receiver.
5) At time t = 5, S(5) = PN: In this state, the transmitter knows H1(5) perfectly. It
sends,
X(5) = [G1(v, K2) 0]
T +G4(v)H1(5)
⊥. (109)
The receivers receive:
Y (5) = h11(5)G1(v, K2) (110)
Z(5) = h21(5)G1(v, K2) +G4(v)H2(5)H1(5)
⊥. (111)
6) At time t = 6, S(6) = NP: Now the transmitter knows H2(6) perfectly, and it sends:
X(6) = [L2(u, K1) 0] + L4(u)H2(6)
⊥. (112)
The received signals are:
Y (6) = h11(6)L2(u, K1) + L4(u)H1(6)H2(6)
⊥ (113)
Z(6) = h21(6)L2(u, K1). (114)
Let us summarize the received signals at each receiver after these 6 time slots:
Y =


K1
L1(u, K1) +G1(v, K2)
α1G1(v, K2) + L3(u)
L2(u, K1)
G1(v, K2)
α2L2(u, K1) + L4(u)


, Z =


K2
L2(u, K1) +G2(v, K2)
G1(v, K2)
β1L2(u, K1) + G3(v)
β2G1(v, K2) +G4(v)
L2(u, K1)


.
The information symbols can now be decoded at the intended receivers from these ob-
servations. Also the leakage of information is only o(logP ), as we prove next.
Security guarantees :
For the first user’s symbols u = (u1, u2, u3, u4), we have,
I(u;Z|H) ≤I(u;L2(u, K1)|H) (115)
=h(L2(u, K1)|H)− h(L2(u, K1)|u,H) (116)
≤ logP − h(K1|u,H) + o(logP ) (117)
= logP − h(K1|H) + o(logP ) (118)
= logP − logP + o(logP ) (119)
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=o(logP ), (120)
where (115) follows from the Markov chain U → L2(u, K1)→ Z.
For the second user’s symbols, the information leakage at the first receiver is:
I(v;Y|H) ≤I(v;G1(v, K2)|H) (121)
=h(G1(v, K2)|H)− h(G1(v, K2)|v,H) (122)
≤ logP − h(K2|v,H) + o(logP ) (123)
= logP − h(K2|H) + o(logP ) (124)
= logP − logP + o(logP ) (125)
=o(logP ), (126)
where (89) follows from the Markov chain v→ G1(v, K2)→ Y.
4.5 Schemes Achieving Sum s.d.o.f. of 1
4.5.1 Scheme S11
We first recap the scheme S11 which uses the state DD to achieve (d1, d2) = (
1
2
, 1
2
). This
scheme was presented in [43]. The scheme was used to transmit 2 information symbols to
each receiver in 4 time slots. At t = 1, the transmitter sends artificial noise symbols using
both antennas. The received signals act as keys K1 and K2 for the respective users 1 and
2. Since there is delayed CSIT, the transmitter can reconstruct these keys and use them
in the next slots. At t = 2, the transmitter sends the two information symbols (u1, u2)
intended for the first receiver linearly combined with the first user’s key. Thus, the first user
can retrieve a linear combination of just its intended symbols. However, the second user
gets a linear combination L(u1, u2, K1). Due to delayed CSIT however, the transmitter can
reconstruct L. In the third slot, the roles of the receivers are reversed and the transmitter
sends the second user’s symbols (v1, v2) linearly combined with the second user’s key K2.
This allows the second user to retrieve a linear combination of just its information symbol,
which however remain secure at the first user, which receives G(v1, v2, K2). In the fourth slot,
the transmitter sends a linear combination of L and G. Essentially this provides the first
user with L, from which it can eliminate K1 to get another independent linear combination
of (u1, u2). A similar situation takes place at the second user. Finally, each user has two
linearly independent combinations of two symbols and thus can decode the information
symbols intended for it. The information leakage is only o(logP ), as shown in [43].
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4.5.2 Scheme S12
In this sub-section, we present the scheme S12 which uses the states (DD,NN) with fractions
(1
2
, 1
2
) to achieve (d1, d2) = (
1
2
, 1
2
).
The scheme S11 requires delayed CSIT from at least one user for the first 3 time slots.
We need to modify this scheme to ensure that delayed CSIT is required only for 2 of the 4
time slots. Fig. 8 shows the new scheme. It is as follows:
1) At time t = 1, S(1) = DD: The strategy in this slot is the same as in the scheme S11 .
In this slot, the transmitter sends artificial noise symbols to create keys that can be used in
later slots. The channel input is
X(1) = [q1 q2]
T , (127)
where q1 and q2 are i.i.d. as CN (0, P ). The received signals are:
Y (1) =h11(1)q1 + h12(1)q2
∆
= K1 (128)
Z(1) =h21(1)q1 + h22(1)q2
∆
= K2. (129)
Due to delayed CSIT, the transmitter learns K1 and K2 and uses them in the next time
slots.
2) At time t = 2, S(2) = DD: Instead of sending only the first user’s symbols as in
scheme S11 , the transmitter now sends linear combination of both users’ symbols. It sends:
X(2) = [u1 + v1 +K1 u2 + v2 +K2]
T . (130)
The received signals are:
Y (2) =h11(u1 + v1 +K1) + h12(u2 + v2 +K2) (131)
∆
=L1(u1, u2, K1) +G1(v1, v2, K2) (132)
Z(2) =h21(u1 + v1 +K1) + h22(u2 + v2 +K2) (133)
∆
=L2(u1, u2, K1) +G2(v1, v2, K2). (134)
We notice that if L2 and G1 could be provided to both users, each user can get 2 linear
combinations of the symbols intended for it and hence decode both symbols. Hence, in the
remaining two slots, we will transmit L2 and G1 to both users and this will not require any
CSIT from any user.
3) At time t = 3, S(3) = NN: The transmitter does not have any CSIT. It sends:
X(3) = [L2(u1, u2, K1) 0]
T . (135)
26
12
Tx
H1(t)
H2(t)
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
StateCSIT
decode u1, u2
decode v1, v2
NN
K1
K2
DD DD
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Figure 8: Achieving sum s.d.o.f. of 1 using S12 .
The received signals are:
Y (3) =h11(3)L2(u1, u2, K1) (136)
Z(3) =h21(3)L2(u1, u2, K1). (137)
4) At time t = 4, S(4) = NN: The transmitter sends:
X(4) = [G1(v1, v2, K2) 0]
T . (138)
The received signals are:
Y (4) =h11(4)G1(v1, v2, K2) (139)
Z(4) =h21(4)G1(v1, v2, K2). (140)
Thus, at the end of 4 slots the received signals may be summarized as:
Y =


K1
L1(u1, u2, K1) +G1(v1, v2, K2)
L2(u1, u2, K1)
G1(v1, v2, K2)

 , Z =


K2
L2(u1, u2, K1) +G2(v1, v2, K2)
L2(u1, u2, K1)
G1(v1, v2, K2)

 .
Clearly, user 1 can decode (u1, u2) and user 2 can get (v1, v2). The information leakage is at
most o(logP ) as we show below.
Security guarantees :
For the first user’s symbols u = (u1, u2), we have,
I(u;Z|H) ≤I(u;L2(u, K1)|H) (141)
=h(L2(u, K1)|H)− h(L2(u, K1)|u,H) (142)
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≤ logP − h(K1|u,H) + o(logP ) (143)
= logP − h(K1|H) + o(logP ) (144)
= logP − logP + o(logP ) (145)
=o(logP ), (146)
where (141) follows from the Markov chain U → L2(u, K1)→ Z.
For the second user’s symbols v = (v1, v2), the information leakage at the first receiver
is:
I(v;Y|H) ≤I(v;G1(v, K2)|H) (147)
=h(G1(v, K2)|H)− h(G1(v, K2)|v,H) (148)
≤ logP − h(K2|v,H) + o(logP ) (149)
= logP − h(K2|H) + o(logP ) (150)
= logP − logP + o(logP ) (151)
=o(logP ), (152)
where (147) follows from the Markov chain v→ G1(v, K2)→ Y.
4.5.3 Scheme S13
We next present a novel scheme S13 which uses the states (DN,ND) with fractions (
1
2
, 1
2
) to
achieve (d1, d2) = (
1
2
, 1
2
). In particular, we present a scheme which achieves the s.d.o.f. pair
(d1, d2) =
(
2n
4n+1
, 2n
4n+1
)
as a function of the block length n. Taking the limit n → ∞ yields
the s.d.o.f. pair
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
.
The scheme is shown in Fig. 9. Unlike all the other schemes in this paper where the
optimal sum s.d.o.f. can be achieved within a finite number of time slots, this scheme cannot
achieve sum s.d.o.f. of 1 in a finite number of slots. Indeed, there does not exist a scheme
that can achieve sum s.d.o.f. of 1 in finitely many slots. To see why, assume that there exists
such a scheme with n slots. In this scheme, states DN and ND occur for equal fractions
of time; thus, λD = λN =
1
2
. Now, note that the delayed CSIT in the last slot cannot be
used; thus, the scheme would work equally well if the last slot were NN instead of DN or
ND. However, changing the state in the last slot to NN would imply λD <
1
2
, which in turn
implies that d1 + d2 < 1 from (18). Thus, no scheme that uses only a finite number of slots
can achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of 1.
Here we provide an asymptotic scheme that achieves a sum s.d.o.f. of 4n
4n+1
in n slots. As
the number of slots n→ ∞, the sum s.d.o.f. approaches 1. We wish to send 2n symbols to
each receiver in 4n + 1 time slots. The scheme involves transmission in 4 blocks where the
first 3 blocks, say A, B and C each have n time slots, while the last block D has n+1 slots;
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Figure 9: Achieving sum s.d.o.f. of 4n/(4n+ 1) using scheme S13 .
thus, a total of 4n+ 1 time slots are required in the scheme. The scheme is as follows:
1) In block A, S(t) = DN: In each time slot i in block A, the transmitter generates two
artificial noise symbols and sends them using its two antennas. The receivers receive different
linear combinations of the two artificial noise symbols K2i−1 and K2i as shown in Fig. 9. Due
to delayed CSIT from the first user, the transmitter can reconstruct each of K2i−1, i = 1, . . .,
by the end of block A. Thus, they can act as shared keys between the transmitter and the
first receiver. However, since the second receiver does not feedback any CSIT (due to the
fact that the state in the block is DN), the transmitter cannot reconstruct the observations
of the second receiver at the end of block A.
2) In block B, S(t) = ND: At the beginning of this slot, the transmitter has the keys
K2i−1, i = 1, . . . , n shared with the first user. It uses these keys to send information intended
for the first user. It creates 2n linearly independent combinations of the 2n symbols intended
for the first receiver: a1, . . . , a2n. In slot i, it transmits
XB(i) = [a2i−1 +K2i−1 a2i +K2i−1]
T . (153)
The first and second receivers receive linearly independent combinations L2i−1(A2i−1, K2i−1)
and L2i(A2i, K2i−1) in slot i, where Ai denotes the ith linear combination of the first user’s
symbols, as shown in Fig. 9. Since the state is ND, the second user provides delayed CSIT
to the transmitter. In the ith slot, the second user feeds back HA2 (i), that is, the channel
coefficients of the second user in slot i within block A. Note that this is unlike any other
achievable scheme we have encountered so far; in all other schemes, the receiver feeds back
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the channel coefficients of the current slot which appears as delayed CSIT at the beginning
of the next slot. Thus, at the end of slot B, the transmitter has all the channel coefficients
of the second user from block A; thus, it can reconstruct the outputs of the second receiver
in block A, K2i, i = 1, . . . , n, which now act as shared keys between the transmitter and the
second receiver.
3) In block C, S(t) = ND: At the beginning of this slot, the transmitter has the keys
K2i, i = 1, . . . , n shared with the second user. It uses these keys to send information securely
to the second user. It creates 2n linearly independent combinations of the 2n symbols
intended for the second receiver: b1, . . . , a2n. In slot i, it transmits
XC(i) = [b2i−1 +K2i−1 b2i +K2i−1]
T . (154)
The first and second receivers receive linearly independent combinations G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i)
and G2i(B2i, K2i) in slot i, where Bi denotes the ith linear combination of the second user’s
symbols, as shown in Fig. 9. As CSIT, in the ith slot, the second user feeds back the channel
coefficients HB2 (i), which allows the transmitter to reconstruct L2i(A2i, K2i−1). Note that
now if L2i(A2i, K2i−1) and G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i) could be exchanged, each of the receivers would
receive 2n linear combinations of the 2n symbols intended for it, thus, allowing both receivers
to decode their own messages. However, G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i) is not known to the transmitter
yet, since the first user has not fed back its channel in block C. This CSIT will be obtained
in the next block.
4) In block D, S(t) = ND: The transmitter wishes to send the symbols L2i(A2i, K2i−1) +
G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i), i = 1, . . . , n, in this block. To do so, the transmitter does not transmit
anything in the first slot in this block. It only acquires the channel coefficients HC1 (i) from
the first user who is supplying delayed CSIT in this block. In the ith slot, i = 1, . . . , n, the
transmitter acquires the channel coefficients HC1 (i) and transmits:
XD(i) = [L2i−2(A2i−2, K2i−3) +G2i−3(B2i−3, K2i−2) 0]
T , i = 2, . . . , n+ 1. (155)
The first user can now obtain L2i−1(A2i−1, K2i−1) and L2i(A2i, K2i−1) for every i = 1, . . . , n,
while the second user obtains G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i) and G2i(B2i, K2i) for i = 1, . . . , n. Now by
eliminating the respective keys, each user can decode the 2n symbols intended for it from the
2n linearly independent combinations available to it. Also the keys ensure the confidentiality,
and the information leakage is only o(logP ), as we show next.
Security guarantees :
Let u = (a1, . . . , a2n) and v = (b1, . . . , b2n) be the symbols intended for users 1 and 2,
respectively. The leakage of u at user 2 is given by
I(u;Z|H) ≤I(u; {L2i(A2i, K2i−1)}
n
i=1 |H) (156)
30
=h({L2i(A2i, K2i−1)}
n
i=1 |H)− h({L2i(A2i, K2i−1)}
n
i=1 |u,H) (157)
≤n logP − h({K2i−1}
n
i=1 |H) + o(logP ) (158)
=n logP − n logP + o(logP ) (159)
=o(logP ), (160)
where (156) follows due to the Markov chain u → {L2i(A2i, K2i−1)}
n
i=1 → Z, and (159)
follows from the fact that {K2i−1}
n
i=1 are mutually independent and each is distributed as
N (0, P ).
Similarly, for the second user’s symbols, the leakage at the first user is given by,
I(v;Y|H) ≤I(v; {G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i)}
n
i=1 |H) (161)
=h({G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i)}
n
i=1 |H)− h({G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i)}
n
i=1 |v,H) (162)
≤n logP − h({K2i}
n
i=1 |H) + o(logP ) (163)
=n logP − n logP + o(logP ) (164)
=o(logP ), (165)
where (161) follows due to the Markov chain v → {G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i)}
n
i=1 → Y, and (164)
follows from the fact that {K2i}
n
i=1 are mutually independent and each is distributed as
N (0, P ).
4.6 Schemes Achieving Sum s.d.o.f. of 2/3
4.6.1 Scheme S
2/3
1
The scheme S
2/3
1 uses the state DD to achieve (d1, d2) = (
2
3
, 0). Such a scheme was presented
in [43]. The scheme can be summarized as follows. At time t = 1, the transmitter sends
two artificial noise symbols using its two antennas. Each user receives a different linear
combination of the noise symbols and they act as keys. Let K1 and K2 be the keys at
receivers 1 and 2, respectively. Due to delayed CSIT, the transmitter can reconstruct K1.
At time t = 2, the transmitter sends the two symbols intended for the first receiver (u1, u2),
linearly combined with K1. Receiver 1 can remove K1 from its received signal and get one
linear combination of (u1, u2) at the end of this slot. The second user receives a linear
combination of u1, u2 and K1, say L(u1, u2, K1); however, not knowing K1, it cannot decode
the information symbols. Due to delayed CSIT, the transmitter learns L and transmits it in
t = 3. The second receiver gets no new information but the first receiver can get a second
linear combination of (u1, u2) by eliminating K1 from L. This allows receiver 1 to decode
(u1, u2), while the information leakage to receiver 2 is o(logP ).
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4.6.2 Scheme S
2/3
2
The scheme S
2/3
2 uses the states (DD,NN) with fractions (
2
3
, 1
3
) to achieve (d1, d2) = (
2
3
, 0).
We note that in scheme S
2/3
1 , the delayed CSIT in slot t = 3 is not required. Thus, the
scheme can work with the states (DD,NN) with fractions (2
3
, 1
3
), and we call this S
2/3
2 .
4.6.3 Scheme S
2/3
3
Finally, the scheme S
2/3
3 uses the states (DN,ND,NN) with fractions (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) to achieve
(d1, d2) = (
2
3
, 0). We notice that instead of having DD state in the first two slots, it suffices
to have DN in the first slot (since the transmitter does not need K2) and ND in the second
slot (since the transmitter only needs to reconstruct the second user’s received signal L).
Thus, it suffices to have the states (DN,ND,NN) with fractions (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) for the scheme to
work, and we call this S
2/3
3 .
5 Achievability
Now that we have all the required constituent schemes summarized in Table 1, we proceed
to show how these schemes can be combined to achieve the region stated in Theorem 1. We
restate the region of Theorem 1 here for convenience:
d1 ≤ min
(
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
, 1− λNN
)
(166)
d2 ≤ min
(
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
, 1− λNN
)
(167)
3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP (168)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP (169)
d1 + d2 ≤ 2(λP + λD). (170)
We classify this region into two cases:
• Case A: in which d1+ d2 bound of (170) is inactive. This corresponds to the condition
1 + λP ≤ 2λP + 2λD, (171)
which is equivalent to
λN ≤ λD. (172)
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• Case B: in which d1 + d2 bound of (170) is active which corresponds to
λN > λD. (173)
In the next two sub-sections, we present the achievability for each of these cases separately.
5.1 Achievability for Case A: λD ≥ λN
For Case A, the s.d.o.f. region reduces to:
d1 ≤ min
(
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
, 1− λNN
)
(174)
d2 ≤ min
(
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
, 1− λNN
)
(175)
3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP (176)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP . (177)
Depending on which single user bound is active, we consider two cases:
1. 2+2λP−λPP
3
≤ 1− λNN , which is equivalent to the condition λDD + 2λDN ≥ 2λNN ,
2. 2+2λP−λPP
3
≥ 1− λNN , which is equivalent to the condition λDD + 2λDN ≤ 2λNN .
As shown in Fig. 10, due to symmetry, it suffices to achieve the points P1 and P2 in each
case.
5.1.1 Achievability of Point P1
We first show the achievability of the point P1 in both cases. To do so, let us consider the
two cases one by one:
1. λDD + 2λDN ≥ 2λNN : In this case, the single user bounds are:
d1 ≤
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
(178)
d2 ≤
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
. (179)
As seen in Fig. 10a, the point P1 is
(
2+2λP−λPP
3
, λPP
)
. To achieve this point, using
the state PP, we achieve (1, 1), with PD,DP,PN,NP, we achieve the pair (1, 0) either
through zero-forcing, or by transmitting artificial noise in a direction orthogonal to the
first user’s channel. For the states (DD,NN) ∼ (2
3
, 1
3
), and (DN,ND,NN) ∼ (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
),
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2
, 1+λP
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3
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2
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(1− λNN , 2λNN − λDD − 2λDN + λPP )
(b) λDD + 2λDN ≤ 2λNN .
Figure 10: s.d.o.f. regions in case A.
we achieve the pair (2
3
, 0) by using the schemes S
2/3
2 and S
2/3
3 , respectively. Essentially,
the NN state can be fully alternated with the DD state and the DN and ND states to
achieve 2
3
s.d.o.f. for user 1.
Time sharing yields the following s.d.o.f. pair:
d2 = λPP (180)
d1 = λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
2
(λDD + 2λDN + λNN) (181)
= 2λP − λPP +
2
3
(λDD + λNN ) (182)
= 2λP − λPP +
2
3
(1− 2λP + λPP ) (183)
=
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
. (184)
2. λDD + 2λDN ≤ 2λNN : In this case the single user bounds are:
d1 ≤1− λNN (185)
d2 ≤1− λNN . (186)
Again, we wish to achieve the point P1 in Fig. 10b. The point P1 is given by:
P1 : (d1, d2) = (1− λNN , λPP + (2λNN − 2λDN − λDD)). (187)
Here we consider two further subcases
• λNN ≤ λDD + λDN : In this case, to achieve the point P1, we first use up the full
DN and ND states with a part of the NN state using scheme S
2/3
3 . We alternate
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the remaining (λNN − λDN) duration of NN state with the DD state using two
schemes: S
2/3
2 and S
1
2 . Note that in this subcase, 0 ≤ 2(λDD+λDN−λNN) ≤ λDD.
We use the state DD for duration 2(λDD+λDN −λNN) and state NN for duration
(λDD + λDN − λNN) together using scheme S
2/3
2 to achieve the s.d.o.f. pair
(
2
3
, 0
)
.
The remaining (2λNN − 2λDN −λDD) duration of the state NN is alternated with
the remaining (2λNN −2λDN −λDD) duration of state DD using the scheme S12 to
achieve the s.d.o.f. pair
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. The state PP allows us to achieve the s.d.o.f. pair
(1, 1) while the remaining states PD, DP, PN, and NP each achieves (1, 0). Thus,
by using time sharing, the s.d.o.f. pair is:
d1 =λPP + 1× 2λPD + 1× 2λPN +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
3
×3λDN +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
2
×3(λDD + λDN − λNN)
+
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2(2λNN − 2λDN − λDD) (188)
=1− λNN (189)
d2 =λPP +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2(2λNN − 2λDN − λDD)
=λPP + (2λNN − 2λDN − λDD), (190)
which is precisely the point P1.
• λNN ≥ λDD + λDN : In this case, the state NN cannot be completely used with
the states DD, DN and ND. But we note that λD ≥ λN implies that λD ≥ λNN .
We first use up the DN and ND states by alternating with the NN state using
scheme S
2/3
3 . A portion λDD of the remaining (λNN − λDN) duration of the NN
state uses up the DD state in scheme S12 achieving the pair
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. The remaining
(λNN − λDN − λDD) portion of the NN state is used with the PD and DP states
through the scheme S
4/3
1 to achieve the pair
(
2
3
, 2
3
)
. For the remainder of the
state PD, DP and the states PN, NP, we can achieve the pair (1, 0), while (1, 1)
is achieved in the PP state. By time sharing, we get
d1 =λPP + 2λPN +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
3
×3λDN +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
×3(λNN − λDN − λDD)
+ 2(λPD − λNN + λDN + λDD) +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2λDD (191)
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=1− λNN (192)
d2 =λPP +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
×3(λNN − λDN − λDD) +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2λDD (193)
=λPP + 2λNN − 2λDN − λDD, (194)
which is again the point P1.
5.1.2 Achieving the Sum s.d.o.f. Achieving Point P2
The point P2 corresponds to:
P2 : (d1, d2) =
(
1 + λP
2
,
1 + λP
2
)
. (195)
We rewrite the condition λD ≥ λN corresponding to case A as:
λPD + λDD ≥ λPN + λNN . (196)
From this condition it is not immediately clear how the constituent schemes should be jointly
utilized. Hence we break this condition into three mutually exclusive cases:
1. Sub-case A1: λPD ≥ λPN and λDD ≥ λNN ,
2. Sub-case A2: λPD ≥ λPN and λDD ≤ λNN ,
3. Sub-case A3: λPD ≤ λPN and λDD ≥ λNN .
Now, we consider these three sub-cases one by one:
Sub-case A1: λPD ≥ λPN and λDD ≥ λNN . In this sub-case, the original condition λD ≥ λN
is automatically satisfied. For this sub-case, it is clear that the states PN and NP can be
fully alternated along with the PD and DP using scheme S
3/2
2 to achieve
3
2
s.d.o.f. The
remaining fraction of time for PD (and DP) is hence: λPD−λPN . The state NN can be fully
utilized along with DD to achieve 1 s.d.o.f. using the scheme S12 . The DN and ND states are
alternated with each other to achieve 1 s.d.o.f. Thus, we achieve the following sum s.d.o.f.:
d1 + d2 = 2︸︷︷︸
S2
×λPP +
3
2︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
2
×(2λPD + 2λPN) + 1︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×(λDD + λNN ) + 2λDN
= 2λPP + 3λPD + 3λPN + λDD + λNN + 2λDN (197)
= 1 + λP . (198)
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Sub-case A2: λPD ≥ λPN , λDD ≤ λNN . As in sub-case A1, we can fully alternate the PN
and NP states with the PD and DP states using the scheme S
3/2
2 to achieve the s.d.o.f. of
3
2
.
Since λDD ≤ λNN , we instead fully alternate the state DD along with NN using scheme S12
to achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of 1. The remaining fraction of the NN state is λNN − λDD which
can be alternated with the remaining fraction of (PD,DP), which is λPD − λPN as long as
λPD − λPN ≥ λNN − λDD. This achieves
4
3
sum s.d.o.f. Indeed, this is feasible as this is
precisely the condition λD ≥ λN . The DN and ND states are alternated with each other to
achieve 1 s.d.o.f.
d1 + d2 = 2︸︷︷︸
S2
×λPP +
3
2︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
2
×(4λPN) + 1︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×(2λDD) + 2λDN
+
4
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
×(3(λNN − λDD)) +
3
2︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
1
×2(λPD − λPN − λNN + λDD) (199)
= 2λPP + 6λPN + 2λDD + 4λNN − 4λDD + 3λPD + 3λDD − 3λPN − 3λNN + 2λDN
(200)
= 2λPP + 3λPD + 3λPN + λDD + λNN + 2λDN (201)
= 1 + λP . (202)
Sub-case A3: λPD ≤ λPN , λDD ≥ λNN . Unlike the previous two sub-cases, here, we cannot
fully alternate the PN and NP states with the PD and DP states. Instead, we fully use up the
PD and DP states with a part of the PN and NP states using scheme S
3/2
2 to achieve the sum
s.d.o.f. of 3
2
. The remaining duration of PN (or the NP) state is λPN − λPD. Now, we can
also fully alternate the NN state with DD since λDD ≥ λNN using the scheme S
1
2 to achieve
the sum s.d.o.f. of 1; and thus, the remaining fraction of DD state is λDD − λNN . We now
alternate the remaining PN and NP states with the remaining DD state using the scheme S
4/3
2
to achieve the sum s.d.o.f. of 4
3
. For this to be feasible, we require λDD − λNN ≥ λPN − λPD
which is again precisely the condition λD ≥ λN . The remaining DD state achieves sum
s.d.o.f. of 1 using scheme S11 . The DN and ND states are alternated with each other to
achieve 1 s.d.o.f.
d1 + d2 = 2︸︷︷︸
S2
×λPP +
3
2︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
2
×(4λPD) + 1︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×(2λNN )
+
4
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
2
×(3(λPN − λPD)) + 1︸︷︷︸
S1
1
×(λDD − λNN − λPN + λPD) + 2λDN (203)
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PP ′
(
2+2λp−λPP
3
, λPP
)
(λP + λN , λP + 2λD − λN)
(λP + 2λD − λN , λP + λN)
S
S′
d1
d2
(
λPP ,
2+2λp−λPP
3
)
(a) λDD + 2λDN ≥ 2λNN .
Q
Q′
(2λNN − λDD − 2λDN + λPP , 1− λNN)
(1− λNN , 2λNN − λDD − 2λDN + λPP )
(λP + λN , λP + 2λD − λN)
(λP + 2λD − λN , λP + λN)
S
S′
d1
d2
(b) λDD + 2λDN ≤ 2λNN .
Figure 11: s.d.o.f. regions in case B when 3d1 + d2 and d1 + 3d2 bounds are partially active.
= 2λPP + 6λPD + 2λNN + 4λPN − 4λPD + λPD + λDD − λPN − λNN + 2λDN
(204)
= 2λPP + 3λPD + 3λPN + λDD + λNN + 2λDN (205)
= 1 + λP . (206)
Hence, for Case A, i.e., when λD ≥ λN , we have the complete characterization of the
s.d.o.f. region.
5.2 Achievability for Case B: λN > λD
In this case, the 3d1 + d2/d1 + 3d2 bounds are inactive at the symmetric sum rate point.
However, these 3d1+d2/d1+3d2 bounds play a role at other points in the region, in particular,
when one of the users requires full secure rate, the 3d1 + d2/d1 + 3d2 bounds are relevant
in some cases. Thus, these bounds are still partially relevant. Based on whether the 3d1 +
d2/d1+3d2 bounds are partially relevant or completely irrelevant, we divide our achievability
into two broad cases:
1. 3d1 + d2 bounds are partially relevant, at the point where one user requires full secret
rate,
2. 3d1 + d2 bounds are completely irrelevant to the region.
Now let us investigate each of these two cases individually.
5.2.1 When 3d1 + d2 Bounds are Partially Relevant
This case happens when the intersection of the lines defined by the 3d1 + d2 bound and the
single user bound is inside the region defined by the lines d1 = 0, d2 = 0, single user bounds
and the d1 + d2 bound. We note that this depends on which of the single user bounds is
active, giving rise to two cases, as shown in Fig. 11:
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• 1 − λNN ≥
2+2λP−λPP
3
, in which case, the 3d1 + d2 bounds are always relevant, since
λPP ≤ 2(λP +λD)−
2+2λP−λPP
3
. In this case, when one user requires full rate, it suffices
to achieve extremal point given by:
P : (d1, d2) =
(
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
, λPP
)
, (207)
• 1 − λNN ≤
2+2λP−λPP
3
, in which case, the 3d1 + d2 bounds are relevant as long as
λNN ≤ λD. We will need to show the achievability of one of the extremal points when
one of the users requires full rate, given by:
Q : (d1, d2) = (1− λNN , λPP + (2λNN − 2λDN − λDD)). (208)
However, we note that in both cases, the extremal points that achieve the sum rate are
defined by the intersection of the lines 3d1 + d2 = 2+ 2λP and d1 + d2 = 2(λP + λD). These
points are symmetric with respect to the line d1 = d2 and it suffices to show the achievability
of either one of them. As shown in the figures, it suffices to achieve the point
S : (d1, d2) = (λP + λN , λP + 2λD − λN ). (209)
Thus, to show the achievability of the full region, we need to show how the points P , Q and
S are achieved in their relevant cases. We will begin with point S since it remains unaffected
by which of the single user bounds is active.
The sum rate point S:
Now we are effectively operating under the constraint λNN ≤ λD ≤ λN , and wish to
achieve the point (λP + λN , λP +2λD−λN). From this condition it is not immediately clear
how the constituent schemes should be jointly utilized. Hence we focus on the second half
of the inequality, which simplifies to λPD+λDD ≤ λPN +λNN , and break this condition into
three mutually exclusive cases:
• Sub-case B1: λPD ≤ λPN and λDD ≤ λNN ,
• Sub-case B2: λPD ≥ λPN and λDD ≤ λNN ,
• Sub-case B3: λPD ≤ λPN and λDD ≥ λNN .
Now let us consider each case one by one:
Sub-case B1: λPD ≤ λPN and λDD ≤ λNN : In this case, the full DD state will be used up
with a part of the NN state using scheme S12 to achieve the rate pair
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. The duration of
the remaining NN state is (λNN −λDD). Now if λNN −λDD ≤ λDN , this remaining NN state
can be fully used up with the DN and ND states using scheme S
2/3
3 achieving the pair (
2
3
, 0).
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The remaining DN and ND states achieve the pair (1
2
, 1
2
) using the scheme S13 . The PD and
DP states are fully alternated with the PN and NP states using scheme S
3/2
2 to achieve the
pair
(
3
4
, 3
4
)
. The remaining PN and NP states achieve the pair (1, 0). The rate pair achieved
then is
d1 =λPP +
3
4︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
2
×4λPD +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2λDD + 1× 2(λPN − λPD) +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
3
×3(λNN − λDD)
+
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
3
×2(λDN − λNN + λDD)
=λPP + λPD + λDN + λNN + 2λPN
=λP + λN (210)
d2 =λPP +
3
4︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
2
×4λPD +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2λDD +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
3
×2(λDN − λNN + λDD)
=λPP + 3λPD + 2λDD + λDN − λNN
=λP + 2λD − λN . (211)
If on the other hand, λNN−λDD ≥ λDN , the remaining state NN cannot be fully alternated
with the states DN and ND. However, λNN ≤ λDN +λDD+λPD from our original condition.
Therefore, the full DN and ND states are alternated with a part of the NN state using scheme
S
2/3
3 achieving the pair (
2
3
, 0). The remaining duration of the NN state is (λNN−λDD−λDN),
which can be fully alternated with the PD and DP states using the scheme S
4/3
1 achieving the
pair (2
3
, 2
3
). The remaining PD and DP states can be alternated with the PN and NP states
using scheme S
3/2
2 achieving the point (
3
4
, 3
4
). The rest of the PN and NP states achieve the
point (1, 0). Thus, we have,
d1 =λPP +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2λDD +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
3
×3λDN +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
×3(λNN − λDN − λDD)
+
3
4︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
2
×4(λPD − (λNN − λDN − λDD)) + 1× 2(λPN − λPD + (λNN − λDN − λDD))
=λP + λN (212)
d2 =λPP +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2λDD +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
×3(λNN − λDN − λDD) +
3
4︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
2
×4(λPD − (λNN − λDN − λDD))
=λP + 2λD − λN . (213)
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Sub-case B2: λPD ≥ λPN and λDD ≤ λNN : In this case, since λNN ≥ λDD, the entire DD
state is alternated with a portion of the NN state using scheme S12 to achieve the s.d.o.f. pair(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. The remaining duration of the NN state is λNN − λDD. Now if λNN − λDD ≤ λPD,
the remaining NN state is used with a part of the PD and DP states in scheme S
4/3
1 achieving
the pair
(
2
3
, 2
3
)
. The remaining portion of the PD and DP states can then be utilized with
the PN and NP states using scheme S
3/2
2 achieving the pair
(
3
4
, 3
4
)
. The remaining PN and
NP states are utilized to just achieve the rate pair (1, 0). The DN and ND states are used to
achieve the pair (1
2
, 1
2
) using the scheme S13 . Thus, we have,
d1 =λPP +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
× (2λDD) +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
× (3(λNN − λDD)) +
3
4︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
2
× (4 (λPD − (λNN − λDD)))
+ 1× (2λPN − 2 (λPD − (λNN − λDD))) +
1
2
× 2λDN (214)
=λP + λN (215)
d2 =λPP +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
× (2λDD) +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
× (3(λNN − λDD)) +
3
4︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
2
× (4 (λPD − (λNN − λDD)))
+
1
2
× 2λDN (216)
=λPP + 2λDD + 3λPD − λNN + λDN (217)
=λP + 2λD − λN . (218)
If on the other hand, λNN − λDD ≥ λPD, the full PD and DP states will be used up with a
part of the remaining NN state using scheme S
4/3
1 achieving the pair (
2
3
, 2
3
). The remaining
duration of the NN state is λNN − λDD − λPD, which is less than λDN from our original
condition. Therefore, this remaining NN state can be fully utilized with the DN and ND
states using scheme S
2/3
3 to achieve the pair (
2
3
, 0). The remaining DN and ND states achieve
the pair (1
2
, 1
2
), while the PN and NP states achieve the pair (1, 0). Thus, we have,
d1 =λPP +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2λDD +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
×3λPD +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
3
×3(λNN − λDD − λPD)
+
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
3
×2(λDN + λDD + λPD − λNN) + 1× 2λPN (219)
=λPP + λPD + 2λPN + λDN + λNN (220)
=λP + λN (221)
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d2 =λPP +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2λDD +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
×3λPD +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
3
×2(λDN + λDD + λPD − λNN)
=λPP + 2λDD + 3λPD + λDN − λNN (222)
=λP + 2λD − λN . (223)
Sub-case B3: λPD ≤ λPN and λDD ≥ λNN : To achieve the sum rate point, we should
alternate the entire PD and DP states with part of the PN and NP states using the scheme
S
3/2
2 . Also the entire NN state should be alternated with the DD state using the scheme S
1
2 .
The remaining DD state can then be fully utilized with a part of the remaining PN and NP
states using scheme S
4/3
2 , since, λDD−λNN ≤ λPN −λPD. The remaining PN and NP states
will be exploited to achieve the s.d.o.f. pair (1, 0). The DN and ND states together achieve
the pair (1
2
, 1
2
). Thus, we have,
d1 =λPP +
3
4︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
2
× (4λPD) +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
× (2λNN) +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
2
× (3(λDD − λNN)) +
1
2
× 2λDN
+ 1× (2(λPN − λPD)− 2(λDD − λNN )) (224)
=λPP + λPD + 2λPN + λNN + λDN (225)
=λP + λN (226)
d2 =λPP +
3
4︸︷︷︸
S
3/2
2
× (4λPD) +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
× (2λNN) +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
2
×
(
3(λDD − λNN ) +
1
2
× 2λDN
)
(227)
=λPP + 3λPD + 2λDD − λNN + λDN (228)
=λP + 2λD − λN . (229)
The points P and Q:
• Point P : Recall that we need to achieve the point P :
(
2+2λP−λPP
3
, λPP
)
when 1−λNN ≥
2+2λP−λPP
3
, a condition that simplifies to λDD + 2λDN ≥ 2λNN . To achieve this point,
using the state PP, we achieve (1, 1), with PD,DP,PN,NP, we achieve the pair (1, 0).
For the states (DD,NN) ∼ (2
3
, 1
3
), and (DN,ND,NN) ∼ (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), we achieve the pair
(2
3
, 0) by using the schemes S
2/3
2 and S
2/3
3 , respectively. Essentially, the NN state is
used up with the DD state and the DN and ND states to achieve 2
3
s.d.o.f. for user 1.
Time sharing yields the following s.d.o.f. pair:
d2 = λPP (230)
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d1 = λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
2
(λDD + 2λDN + λNN) (231)
= 2λP − λPP +
2
3
(λDD + 2λDN + λNN) (232)
= 2λP − λPP +
2
3
(1− 2λP + λPP ) (233)
=
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
. (234)
• Point Q: We need to achieve the point Q : (1 − λNN , λPP + (2λNN − 2λDN − λDD))
when 1− λNN ≤
2+2λP−λPP
3
, or equivalently, when λDD + 2λDN ≤ λNN and under the
added constraint λNN ≤ λD. Here, we consider two further subcases:
– λNN ≤ λDD + λDN : In this case, to achieve the point Q, we first use up the full
DN and ND states with a part of the NN state using scheme S
2/3
3 . We alternate
the remaining (λNN − λDN) duration of NN state with the DD state using two
schemes: S
2/3
2 and S
1
2 . Note that in this case, 0 ≤ 2(λDD + λDN − λNN) ≤ λDD.
We use the state DD for duration 2(λDD+λDN −λNN) and state NN for duration
(λDD + λDN − λNN) together using scheme S
2/3
2 to achieve the s.d.o.f. pair
(
2
3
, 0
)
.
The remaining (2λNN − 2λDN −λDD) duration of the state NN is alternated with
the remaining (2λNN −2λDN −λDD) duration of state DD using the scheme S12 to
achieve the s.d.o.f. pair
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. The state PP allows us to achieve the s.d.o.f. pair
(1, 1) while the remaining states PD, DP, PN, and NP each achieves (1, 0). Thus,
by using time sharing, the s.d.o.f. pair is:
d1 =λPP + 1× 2λPD + 1× 2λPN +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
3
×3λDN +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
2
×3(λDD + λDN − λNN)
(235)
+
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2(2λNN − 2λDN − λDD) (236)
=1− λNN (237)
d2 =λPP +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2(2λNN − 2λDN − λDD)
=λPP + (2λNN − 2λDN − λDD), (238)
which is precisely the point Q.
– λNN ≥ λDD+λDN : In this case, the state NN cannot be completely used with the
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states DD, DN and ND. But we note that λD ≥ λNN . We first use up the DN and
ND states by alternating with the NN state using scheme S
2/3
3 . A portion λDD
of the remaining (λNN − λDN) duration of the NN state uses up the DD state in
scheme S12 achieving the pair
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. The remaining (λNN − λDN − λDD) portion
of the NN state is used with the PD and DP states through the scheme S
4/3
1 to
achieve the pair
(
2
3
, 2
3
)
. For the remainder of the state PD, DP and the states PN,
NP, we can achieve the pair (1, 0), while (1, 1) is achieved in the PP state. By
time sharing, we get
d1 =λPP + 2λPN +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
3
×3λDN +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
×3(λNN − λDN − λDD)
+ 2(λPD − λNN + λDN + λDD) +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2λDD (239)
=1− λNN (240)
d2 =λPP +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
×3(λNN − λDN − λDD) +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
×2λDD (241)
=λPP + 2λNN − 2λDN − λDD, (242)
which is again the point Q.
Thus, we have achieved the point Q as well.
This completes the achievability of the full region when the 3d1 + d2 bounds are relevant.
5.2.2 When 3d1 + d2 Bounds are Irrelevant
This case occurs when λNN ≥ λD. In this case, the single user bounds are
d1 ≤1− λNN (243)
d2 ≤1− λNN , (244)
and as shown in Fig. 12a the only point to achieve is given by:
R : (d1, d2) = (1− λNN , λPP + 2λPD + λDD). (245)
Note that λPP +2λPD + λDD ≤ 1− λNN with equality if and only if λPN = λDN = 0. Thus,
it suffices to achieve the point R which goes to the degenerate point (1 − λNN , 1 − λNN)
when λPN = λDN = 0, as shown in Fig. 12b.
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RR
′
(1− λNN , λPP + 2λPD + λDD)
d1
d2
(λPP + 2λPD + λDD, 1− λNN)
(a) λDN + λPN 6= 0.
d1
d2
(1− λNN , 1− λNN)
R
(b) λDN = λPN = 0.
Figure 12: s.d.o.f. regions in case B, when 3d1 + d2 and d1 + 3d2 bounds are completely
irrelevant.
To achieve this point, we alternate part of the NN state with the DD state using scheme
S12 to achieve the pair
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
, and with the PD and DP states using the scheme S
4/3
1 to achieve
the pair
(
2
3
, 2
3
)
and with the DN and ND states using the scheme S
2/3
3 to achieve the pair
(2
3
, 0). The remaining NN state is left unused. The PN and NP states, if available, is used to
achieve the s.d.o.f. pair (1, 0). Thus, we have,
d1 =λPP +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
× (2λDD) +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
× (3λPD) +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
2/3
3
×3λDN + 1× 2λPN
=1− λNN (246)
d2 =λPP +
1
2︸︷︷︸
S1
2
× (2λDD) +
2
3︸︷︷︸
S
4/3
1
× (3λPD) (247)
=λPP + λDD + 2λPD (248)
=1− λNN if λPN = λDN = 0. (249)
This completes the proof of the achievability.
6 Proof of the Converse
6.1 Local Statistical Equivalence Property and Associated Lemma
We introduce a property of the channel which we call local statistical equivalence. Let us
focus on the channel output of receiver 2 corresponding to the state PD and DD at time t:
Zpd(t) = H2,pd(t)Xpd(t) +N2,pd(t) (250)
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Zdd(t) = H2,dd(t)Xdd(t) +N2,dd(t). (251)
Now consider (H˜2,pd(t), H˜2,dd(t)), (N˜2,pd(t), N˜2,dd(t)), which are i.i.d. as (H2,pd(t),H2,dd(t))
and (N2,pd(t), N2,dd(t)), respectively. Using these random variables, we define artificial chan-
nel outputs as:
Z˜pd(t) = H˜2,pd(t)Xpd(t) + N˜2,pd(t) (252)
Z˜dd(t) = H˜2,dd(t)Xdd(t) + N˜2,dd(t). (253)
Let Ω = (Hn, H˜n). Now the local statistical equivalence property is the following:
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ω) = h(Z˜pd(t), Z˜dd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ω). (254)
This property shows that if we consider the outputs of a receiver for such states in which it
supplies delayed CSIT, then the entropy of the channel outputs conditioned on the past out-
puts is the same as that of another artificial receiver whose channel is distributed identically
as the original receiver. Note that in an alternating CSIT setting, we focus on only the states
in which the receiver provides delayed CSIT; hence we call it local. The original and artificial
receivers have statistically equivalent channels in the sense that the conditional differential
entropies of the outputs at the real and the artificial receivers given the past outputs are
equal. The proof of this property is given in Appendix A. We next present the following
lemma which together with the local statistical equivalence property is instrumental in the
converse proofs.
Lemma 1 For our channel model, with CSIT alternating among the states DD, PD and DP
we have:
h(Zn|Ω)
.
≥ h(Y npd, Y
n
dd|Z
n,Ω) (255)
2h(Zn|Ω)
.
≥ h(Y npd, Y
n
dd|Ω) (256)
h(Y n|Ω)
.
≥ h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|Y
n,Ω) (257)
2h(Y n|Ω)
.
≥ h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|Ω), (258)
where a
.
≥ b denotes lim
P→∞
a
logP
≥ lim
P→∞
b
logP
.
This lemma is proved in Appendix B.
In the following sections, we use the local statistical equivalence property along with
Lemma 1 to prove the bounds on individual d.o.f. d1 and d2, the sum d.o.f. (d1 + d2) and
the weighted d.o.f. 3d1 + d2 and d1 + 3d2.
46
6.2 The Single User Bounds
We recall the single user bounds in (14)-(15):
d1 ≤ min
(
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
, 1− λNN
)
(259)
d2 ≤ min
(
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
, 1− λNN
)
. (260)
6.2.1 Proof of di ≤
2+2λP−λPP
3
, i = 1, 2
In this section, we prove the following single-user bounds:
d1 ≤
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
=
2 + 2λP + 2λPD + 2λPN
3
(261)
d2 ≤
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
=
2 + 2λP + 2λPD + 2λPN
3
. (262)
To do so, we enhance the transmitter in the following way:
• First, if in any state, the transmitter has perfect CSIT from any of the users, we
provide perfect CSI for the other user too, that is, the states PP,PD,DP,PN,NP are
all enhanced to the state PP.
• Next, we enhance all the remaining states, (i.e., DD,DN,ND,NN) to DD.
The enhanced channel has two states: PP occurring for λpp = λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN (using
symmetry of the alternation), and DD occurring for the remaining fraction of the time. Now,
we have the following lemma for such a channel with only PP and DD states.
Lemma 2 Consider the two-user MISO BCCM with only two states: PP and DD occurring
for λpp and λdd fractions of time, respectively, such that λpp + λdd = 1. Then,
d1 ≤
2 + λpp
3
(263)
d2 ≤
2 + λpp
3
. (264)
The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix C.1.
Now using λpp = λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN in Lemma 2, we get the bounds in (261)-(262).
6.2.2 Proof of di ≤ 1− λNN , i = 1, 2
In this section, we prove the following single user bounds:
d1 ≤ 1− λNN (265)
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d2 ≤ 1− λNN . (266)
To prove these, we again enhance the transmitter, but in a different way. We provide the
transmitter with perfect CSIT in every state except the NN state, that is, every state except
the NN state is enhanced to the PP state. Thus, we end up with a system with two states:
PP occurring for 1−λNN fraction of the time and NN occurring for λNN fraction of the time.
Note that since there is no delayed CSIT in the enhanced system, there is no feedback. For
such a system we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For the two-user MISO BCCM with only two states: PP and NN occurring for
1− λnn and λnn fractions of time, respectively, and no feedback,
d1 ≤ 1− λnn (267)
d2 ≤ 1− λnn. (268)
The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix C.2.
Using λnn = λNN in Lemma 3, we get the bounds in (265)-(266).
Combining the bounds in (261)-(262) and (265)-(266), we have the bounds in (14)-(15).
6.3 Proof of d1 + d2 Bound
Recall the sum s.d.o.f. bound from (18):
d1 + d2 ≤ 2(λP + λD). (269)
The original system model has nine possible states, namely, PP, DD, NN, DP, PD, PN, NP,
DN, and ND. We enhance the transmitter in the following way: whenever in any state, the
transmitter receives delayed CSI of a channel, we provide perfect CSI of the channel to the
transmitter; in other words, we convert each D state to a P state. This clearly does not
decrease the secrecy capacity (and thus, the s.d.o.f. region). Also note that the enhanced
system does not have any delayed CSIT, and hence no feedback. Now the enhanced system
has only four states: PP, PN, NP, NN, occurring for λpp = λPP + λDD + λDP + λPD,
λpn = λPN +λDN , λnp = λNP +λND and λnn = λNN fractions of time, respectively. For such
a system with four states we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4 Consider the two-user MISO BCCM with only four of the nine states: PP, PN,
NP and NN occurring for λpp, λpn, λnp and λnn fractions of the time, with λpp+ λpn+ λnp+
λnn = 1. Also, assume there is no feedback. Then,
d1 + d2 ≤ 2λpp + λpn + λnp. (270)
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Proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix C.3.
Thus, using λpp = λPP + λDD + λDP + λPD, λpn = λPN + λDN , λnp = λNP + λND and
λnn = λNN in Lemma 4, we have,
d1 + d2 ≤ 2(λPP + λDP + λPD + λDD) + λPN + λDN + λNP + λND (271)
= 2(λP + λD), (272)
where (272) follows due to the assumed symmetry: λPD = λDP , and this completes the proof
of the bound on d1 + d2.
6.4 Proof of 3d1 + d2 and d1 + 3d2 Bounds
In this section, we prove the following bounds from (16)-(17):
3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN (273)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN . (274)
To do so, we enhance the system in the following way: Whenever in any state, the transmitter
has no CSIT from a user, we provide the transmitter delayed CSIT of that user’s channel; in
other words, we enhance each N state to a D state. After this enhancement, we are left with
only four states, namely PP, PD, DP and DD occurring for λpp = λPP , λpd = λPD + λPN ,
λdp = λDP +λNP and λdd = λDD+λDN +λND+λNN fractions of the time, respectively. We
have the following lemma for such a system with four states:
Lemma 5 Consider the two-user MISO BCCM with only four of the nine states: PP, PD,
DP and DD occurring for λpp, λpd, λdp and λdd fractions of the time, with λpd = λdp and
λpp + λpd + λdp + λdd = 1. Then,
3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λpp + 2λpd (275)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λpp + 2λpd. (276)
We provide a proof for this lemma in Appendix C.4.
Using λpp = λPP , λpd = λPD+λPN , λdp = λDP +λNP and λdd = λDD+λDN+λND+λNN
in Lemma 5, and symmetry of the alternating states, we have,
3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN (277)
= 2 + 2λP (278)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN (279)
= 2 + 2λP , (280)
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which completes the proofs for the bounds on 3d1 + d2 and d1 + 3d2.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the two-user MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages
(BCCM) and characterized its secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region with alternating
channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT). The converse proofs for the s.d.o.f. re-
gion presented in the paper are based on novel arguments such as local statistical equivalence
property and enhancing the system model in different ways, where each carefully chosen en-
hancement strictly improves the quality of CSIT in a certain manner. For each such enhanced
system, we invoke the local statistical equivalence property and incorporate the confiden-
tiality constraints and obtain corresponding upper bounds on the individual (d1, d2), sum
(d1 + d2) and weighted (3d1 + d2, d1 + 3d2) s.d.o.f.
To establish the achievability of the s.d.o.f. region, several constituent schemes are devel-
oped, where each scheme by itself only operates over a subset of 9 states. The achievability
of the optimal s.d.o.f. region is then established by time-sharing between the core con-
stituent schemes. The core constituent schemes not only serve the purpose of establishing
the s.d.o.f. region but also highlight the synergies across multiple CSIT states which can be
exploited to achieve higher s.d.o.f. in comparison to their individually optimal s.d.o.f. values.
Besides highlighting the synergistic benefits of alternating CSIT for secrecy, the optimal
s.d.o.f. region also quantifies the information theoretic minimal CSIT required from each
user to attain a certain s.d.o.f. value. In addition, we also quantify the loss in d.o.f., as a
function of the overall CSIT quality, which must be incurred for incorporating confidentiality
constraints.
Appendix A Proof of Local Statistical Equivalence
In this section, we prove the local statistical equivalence property:
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ω) = h(Z˜pd(t), Z˜dd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ω). (281)
To this end, first denote the common distribution of (H2,pd(t),H2,dd(t)), (H˜2,pd(t), H˜2,dd(t))
by F . Let Ω =
{
H1(t),H2(t), H˜1(t), H˜2(t), t = 1, . . . , n
}
be the set of all channel vectors
upto and including time n. Also, let Ωt = Ω\
{
H2,pd(t), H˜2,pd(t),H2,dd(t), H˜2,dd(t)
}
. We
have,
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd Ω)
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=EF
[
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ωt, H˜2,pd(t), H˜2,dd(t),H2,pd(t) = h(t),H2,dd(t) = g(t))
]
(282)
=EF
[
h(h(t)Xpd(t) +N2,pd(t), g(t)Xdd(t) +N2,dd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ωt)
]
(283)
=EF
[
h(h(t)Xpd(t) + N˜2,pd(t), g(t)Xdd(t) + N˜2,dd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ωt)
]
(284)
=EF
[
h(h(t)Xpd(t) + N˜2,pd(t), g(t)Xdd(t) + N˜2,dd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
pd ,Ωt, H˜2,pd(t) = h(t),
H˜2,dd(t) = g(t))
]
(285)
=EF
[
h(Z˜pd(t), Z˜dd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ωt,H2,pd(t),H2,dd(t), H˜2,pd(t) = h(t), H˜2,dd(t) = g(t))
]
(286)
=h(Z˜pd(t), Z˜dd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ω), (287)
where (283) follows because (Xpd(t),Xdd(t)) does not depend on
(
H2,pd(t), H˜2,pd(t),H2,dd(t),
H˜2,dd(t)
)
, (284) follows since the additive noises (N2,pd(t), N2,dd(t)) and (N˜2,pd(t), N˜2,dd(t)) are
i.i.d. and independent of all other random variables, (285)-(286) follow since (H2,pd(t),H2,dd(t))
and (H˜2,pd(t), H˜2,dd(t)) have the same distribution F and the fact that (Xpd(t),Xdd(t)) does
not depend on (H2,pd(t), H˜2,pd(t),H2,pd(t), H˜2,dd(t)).
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 1
We consider the scenario in which there are only three CSIT states, namely DD,PD and DP.
For such a specific alternating CSIT model, we define the channel outputs as:
Zn ,
(
Zndd, Z
n
pd, Z
n
dp
)
Y n ,
(
Y ndd, Y
n
pd, Y
n
dp
)
.
Also let Ω denote the set of all channel vectors upto and including time n, that is, in other
words, Ω =
{
H1(t),H2(t), H˜1(t), H˜2(t), t = 1, . . . , n
}
. We wish to prove that with CSIT
alternating among the states DD, PD and DP we have:
h(Zn|Ω)
.
≥ h(Y npd, Y
n
dd|Z
n,Ω) (288)
2h(Zn|Ω)
.
≥ h(Y npd, Y
n
dd|Ω) (289)
h(Y n|Ω)
.
≥ h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|Y
n,Ω) (290)
2h(Y n|Ω)
.
≥ h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|Ω). (291)
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First we note that due to symmetry, it suffices to prove (288) and (289). We proceed as
follows:
h(Zn|Ω) =h(Znpd, Z
n
dd|Ω) + h(Z
n
dp|Z
n
pd, Z
n
ddΩ) (292)
=
n∑
t=1
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ω) + h(Z
n
dp|Z
n
pd, Z
n
dd,Ω). (293)
Using the local statistical equivalence property, we get,
h(Zn|Ω) =
n∑
t=1
h(Z˜pd(t), Z˜dd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ω) + h(Z
n
dp|Z
n
pd, Z
n
dd,Ω). (294)
Adding (293) and (294), and lower bounding, we get,
2h(Zn|Ω) ≥
n∑
t=1
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t), Z˜pd(t), Z˜dd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ω) + 2h(Z
n
dp|Z
n
pd, Z
n
ddΩ)
≥
n∑
t=1
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t), Z˜pd(t), Z˜dd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ω) + h(Z
n
dp|Z
n
pd, Z
n
dd,Ω)
+ no(logP ) (295)
=
n∑
t=1
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t), Z˜pd(t), Z˜dd(t), Ypd(t), Ydd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ω)
−
n∑
t=1
h(Ypd(t), Ydd(t)|Zpd(t), Zdd(t), Z˜pd(t), Z˜dd(t), Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd Ω)
+ h(Zndp|Z
n
pd, Z
n
dd,Ω) + no(logP ) (296)
≥
n∑
t=1
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t), Ypd(t), Ydd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd ,Ω) + h(Z
n
dp|Z
n
pd, Z
n
dd,Ω)
+ no(logP ) (297)
≥
n∑
t=1
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t), Ydd(t)Ypd(t)|Z
t−1
pd , Z
t−1
dd , Y
t−1
pd , Y
t−1
dd Ω)
+ h(Zndp|Z
n
pd, Y
n
pd, Y
n
dd, Z
n
dd,Ω) + no(logP ) (298)
=h(Znpd, Z
n
dd, Y
n
pd, Y
n
dd|Ω) + h(Z
n
dp|Z
n
pd, Y
n
pd, Z
n
dd, Y
n
ddΩ) + no(logP ) (299)
=h(Zn, Y npd, Y
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ), (300)
where (295) follows by noting that
h(Zndp|Z
n
pd, Z
n
dd,Ω) ≥ h(Z
n
dp|Z
n
pd, Z
n
dd,X
n,Ω) = no(logP ) (301)
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and (296) follows since given (Zpd(t), Z˜pd(t), Zdd(t), Z˜dd(t)), one can reconstruct (Xpd(t),Xdd(t))
and hence (Ypd(t), Ydd(t)) within noise distortion, implying that
h(Ypd(t), Ydd(t)|Zpd(t), Zdd(t)Z˜pd(t), Z˜dd(t), Z
t−1
pd ,Ω) ≤ no(logP ). (302)
Now both (288) and (289) can be derived from (300). We simply expand the right hand
side of (300) in two ways:
2h(Zn|Ω) ≥h(Zn, Y npd, Y
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ) (303)
=h(Zn|Ω) + h(Y npd, Y
n
dd|Z
n,Ω) + no(logP ), (304)
which implies h(Zn|Ω)
.
≥ h(Y npd, Y
n
dd|Z
n,Ω), which is exactly (288). Alternatively from (300),
we also have
2h(Zn|Ω) ≥h(Y npd, Y
n
dd|Ω) + h(Z
n|Y npd, Y
n
ddΩ) + no(logP ) (305)
≥h(Y npd, Y
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ), (306)
which implies 2h(Zn|Ω)
.
≥ h(Y npd, Y
n
dd|Ω), thus proving the relation in (289). This completes
the proof of Lemma 1.
Appendix C Proofs of Lemmas 2-5
C.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Recall that we wish to prove that for the two-user MISO BC with only two states: PP and
DD occurring for λpp and λdd fractions of time, respectively, such that λpp + λdd = 1,
d1 ≤
2 + λpp
3
, d2 ≤
2 + λpp
3
. (307)
To do so, we proceed as follows:
nR1 ≤ I(W1; Y
n
pp, Y
n
dd|Ω) + no(n) (308)
= I(W1; Y
n
dd|Ω) + I(W1; Y
n
pp|Y
n
dd,Ω) + no(n) (309)
≤ nλpp logP + I(W1; Y
n
dd|Ω) + no(n) (310)
≤ nλpp logP + I(W1; Y
n
dd, Z
n
dd|Ω) + no(n) (311)
≤ nλpp logP + I(W1; Y
n
dd|Z
n
dd,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (312)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Y
n
dd|Z
n
dd,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (313)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Z
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (314)
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where (308) follows from decodability ofW1 at receiver 1 and Fano’s inequality, (313) follows
from confidentiality constraint of messageW1 at receiver 2, and (314) follows from application
of Lemma 1.
Starting from (310), we also have
nR1 ≤ nλpp logP + I(W1; Y
n
dd|Ω) + no(n) (315)
≤ nλpp logP + I(W1; Y
n
dd|Ω)− I(W1;Z
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (316)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Y
n
dd|Ω)− h(Y
n
dd|W1,Ω)− h(Z
n
dd|Ω) + h(Z
n
dd|W1,Ω) + no(logP )
+ no(n) (317)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Y
n
dd|Ω)−
1
2
h(Zndd|W1,Ω)− h(Z
n
dd|Ω) + h(Z
n
dd|W1,Ω) + no(logP )
+ no(n) (318)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Y
n
dd|Ω) +
1
2
h(Zndd|W1,Ω)− h(Z
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (319)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Y
n
dd|Ω) +
1
2
h(Zndd|Ω)− h(Z
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (320)
= nλpp logP + h(Y
n
dd|Ω)−
1
2
h(Zndd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (321)
≤ nλpp logP + nλdd logP −
1
2
h(Zndd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (322)
where (316) follows from confidentiality constraint of message W1 at receiver 2, (318) follows
from application of Lemma 1, and (320) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces
differential entropy.
Eliminating h(Zndd|Ω) from the bounds (322) and (314), we have,
3nR1 ≤(3nλpp + 2nλdd) logP + no(logP ) + no(n) (323)
=(2 + λpp)n logP + no(logP ). (324)
Now first dividing by n and letting n→∞, then dividing by logP and letting P →∞, we
get,
d1 ≤
2 + λpp
3
. (325)
By symmetry, we get the same single user bound for user 2, completing the proof of Lemma 2.
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C.2 Proof of Lemma 3
We want to show that for the two-user MISO BC with only two states: PP and NN occurring
for 1− λnn and λnn fractions of time, respectively,
d1 ≤1− λnn (326)
d2 ≤1− λnn. (327)
To prove this, we note that since there is no feedback, the secrecy capacity depends only
on the marginal distributions of channel outputs given the input distribution; [54]. Since the
transmitter does not have channel knowledge of any of the users in the state NN, our system
with outputs
Y n =(Y npp, Y
n
nn) (328)
Zn =(Znpp, Z
n
nn) (329)
has the same secrecy capacity of a new system with outputs given by
Y n =(Y npp, Y
n
nn) (330)
Zn =(Znpp, Y
n
nn). (331)
Thus, from the secrecy requirement, we get,
I(W1; Y
n
nn) = I(W1;Z
n
nn) ≤ I(W1;Z
n) ≤ no(logP ). (332)
Then we have,
nR1 ≤I(W1; Y
n
pp, Y
n
nn) + no(n) (333)
=I(W1; Y
n
nn) + I(W1; Y
n
pp|Y
n
nn) + no(n) (334)
≤I(W1; Y
n
pp|Y
n
nn) + no(logP ) + no(n) (335)
≤h(Y npp|Y
n
nn) + no(logP ) + no(n) (336)
≤h(Y npp) + no(logP ) + no(n) (337)
≤n(1− λnn) logP + no(logP ) + no(n), (338)
where, (335) follows from equation (332), (336) follows since h(Y npp|Y
n
nn,W1) ≥
h(Y npp|Y
n
nn,W1,X
n) ≥ o(logP ), and (337) follows since conditioning reduces differential en-
tropy.
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Dividing by n, and letting n→∞, we get,
R1 ≤ (1− λnn) logP + o(logP ). (339)
Dividing by logP and letting P →∞, we have,
d1 ≤ 1− λnn. (340)
By symmetry, we also have,
d2 ≤ 1− λnn. (341)
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
C.3 Proof of Lemma 4
We wish to prove that for the two-user MISO BC with no feedback and only four of the nine
states: PP, PN, NP and NN occurring for λpp, λpn, λnp and λnn fractions of the time, with
λpp + λpn + λnp + λnn = 1,
d1 + d2 ≤ 2λpp + λpn + λnp. (342)
To that end, for each of the two receivers, we introduce another statistically equivalent
receiver. At receiver 1, we introduce a virtual receiver 1˜, with channel output denoted by
Y˜ , while the channel output at the virtual receiver 2˜ at receiver 2 is denoted by Z˜. Since
the secrecy capacity without feedback depends only on the marginals [54], without loss of
generality, we can assume that the channels in the state NN are the same for all receivers.
The outputs at each of the receivers are
Y n =(Y npp, Y
n
pn, Y
n
np, Y
n
nn) (343)
Zn =(Znpp, Z
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn) (344)
Y˜ n =(Y npp, Y
n
pn, Y˜
n
np, Y
n
nn) (345)
Z˜n =(Znpp, Z˜
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn), (346)
where
Y˜np(t) =H˜1,np(t)Xnp(t) + N˜1,np(t) (347)
Z˜pn(t) =H˜2,pn(t)Xpn(t) + N˜2,pn(t), (348)
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such that H˜1,np, H˜2,pn are i.i.d. with the same distribution as H1,np, H2,pn, respectively,
and N˜1,np, N˜2,pn are i.i.d. with same distribution as N1,np, N2,pn. We upper bound the first
receiver’s rate as
nR1 ≤I(W1; Y
n
pp, Y
n
pn, Y
n
np, Y
n
nn|Ω) + no(n) (349)
=I(W1, Y
n
pn, Y
n
np, Y
n
nn|Ω) + I(W1, Y
n
pp|Y
n
pn, Y
n
np, Y
n
nn,Ω) (350)
≤nλpp logP + I(W1, Y
n
pn, Y
n
np, Y
n
nn|Ω) (351)
=nλpp logP + I(W1; Y
n
pnY
n
nn|Ω) + I(W1; Y
n
np|Y
n
pnY
n
nn,Ω) + no(n) (352)
=nλpp logP + I(W1; Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn|Ω) + h(Y
n
np|Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn,Ω)− h(Y
n
np|Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn,W1,Ω) + no(n)
(353)
≤n(λpp + λnp) logP + I(W1; Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn|Ω)− h(Y
n
np|Y
n
nn, Y
n
pn,W1,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP )
(354)
≤n(λpp + λnp) logP + I(W1; Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn, Z
n
pn, Z˜
n
pn, Z
n
np,W2|Ω)
− h(Y nnp|Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn,W1,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (355)
=n(λpp + λnp) logP + I(W1; Y
n
pn, Z˜
n
pn|Y
n
nn, Z
n
pn, Z
n
np,W2,Ω)
− h(Y nnp|Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn,W1,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (356)
=n(λpp + λnp) logP + h(Y
n
pn, Z˜
n
pn|Y
n
nn, Z
n
pn, Z
n
np,W2,Ω)
− h(Y npn, Z˜
n
pn|Z
n
pn, Y
n
nn, Z
n
np,W1,W2,Ω)− h(Y
n
np|Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn,W1,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP )
(357)
≤n(λpp + λnp) logP + h(Y
n
pn, Z˜
n
pn|Z
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,W2,Ω)
− h(Y nnp|Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn,W1,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (358)
=n(λpp + λnp) logP + h(Z˜
n
pn|Z
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,W2,Ω) + h(Y
n
pn|Z
n
pn, Z˜
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,W2,Ω)
− h(Y nnp|Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn,W1,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (359)
≤n(λpp + λnp) logP + h(Z˜
n
pn|Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,W2,Ω)− h(Y
n
np|Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn,W1,Ω)
+ no(n) + no(logP ) (360)
=n(λpp + λnp) logP + h(Z
n
pn|Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,W2,Ω)− h(Y
n
np|Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn,W1,Ω)
+ no(n) + no(logP ), (361)
where (356) follows since,
I(W1;Z
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,W2|Ω) ≤I(W1;Z
n
pp, Z
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,W2|Ω) (362)
=I(W1, Z
n
pp, Z
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn|Ω) + I(W1;W2|Z
n
pp, Z
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,Ω)
(363)
=no(logP ) + I(W1;W2|Z
n
pp, Z
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,Ω) (364)
≤no(logP ) +H(W2|Z
n
pp, Z
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,Ω) (365)
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≤no(logP ) + no(n), (366)
where, (364) and (366) follow from the secrecy and decodability requirements, respectively.
In addition, (358) follows since h(Y npn, Z˜
n
pn|Z
n
pn, Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,W1,W2,Ω) ≥ o(logP ), (360) follows
since given Znpn and Z˜
n
pn, one can reconstruct X
n
pn and hence Y
n
pn to within noise distortion,
and (361) follows due to the statistical equivalence of receivers 2 and 2˜ in the state PN.
Similarly, by symmetry, we have,
nR2 ≤n(λpp + λpn) logP + h(Y
n
np|Y
n
pn, Y
n
nn,W1,Ω)
− h(Znpn|Z
n
np, Y
n
nn,W2,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ). (367)
Adding (361) and (367), we have,
n(R1 +R2) ≤ n(2λpp + λpn + λnp) logP + 2no(n) + o(logP ). (368)
First dividing by n log(P ) and letting n→∞, and then letting P →∞, we obtain,
d1 + d2 ≤ 2λpp + λpn + λnp. (369)
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 5
We want to show that for the two-user MISO BC with only four of the nine states: PP, PD,
DP and DD occurring for λpp, λpd, λdp and λdd fractions of the time, with λpd = λdp and
λpp + λpd + λdp + λdd = 1,
3d1 + d2 ≤2 + 2λpp + 2λpd (370)
d1 + 3d2 ≤2 + 2λpp + 2λpd. (371)
To do so, for each of the two receivers, we introduce another statistically equivalent
receiver. At receiver 1, we introduce a virtual receiver 1˜, with channel output denoted by
Y˜ , while the channel output at the virtual receiver 2˜ at receiver 2 is denoted by Z˜. Since
the capacity depends on the marginals, without loss of generality, we can assume that the
channels in the state NN are the same for all receivers. The outputs at each of the receivers
can be written as
Y n =(Y npp, Y
n
pd, Y
n
dp, Y
n
nn) (372)
Zn =(Znpp, Z
n
pd, Z
n
dp, Y
n
nn) (373)
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Y˜ n =(Y npp, Y
n
pd, Y˜
n
dp, Y
n
nn) (374)
Z˜n =(Znpp, Z˜
n
pd, Z
n
dp, Y
n
nn), (375)
where
Y˜dp(t) =H˜1,dp(t)Xdp(t) + N˜1,dp(t) (376)
Z˜pd(t) =H˜2,pd(t)Xpd(t) + N˜2,pd(t), (377)
such that H˜1,dp, H˜2,pd are i.i.d. with the same distribution as H1,dp, H2,pd, respectively, and
N˜1,dp, N˜2,pd are i.i.d. with same distribution as N1,dp, N2,pd. We consider a special case with
only four states PP, PD, DP and DD. Aided by Lemma 1, we proceed to prove Lemma 5, as
follows:
nR1 ≤I(W1; Y
n|Ω) + no(n) (378)
≤I(W1; Y
n|Ω)− I(W1;Z
n
dpZ
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (379)
≤h(Y n|Ω)−
1
2
h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|W1,Ω)− h(Z
n
dp, Z
n
dd|Ω) + h(Z
n
dp, Z
n
dd|W1,Ω)
+ no(logP ) + no(n) (380)
=h(Y n|Ω) +
1
2
h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|W1,Ω)− h(Z
n
dp, Z
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (381)
≤h(Y n|Ω) +
1
2
h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|Ω)− h(Z
n
dp, Z
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (382)
=h(Y n|Ω)−
1
2
h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (383)
≤n logP −
1
2
h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (384)
where (379) follows from the security constraints, (380) follows from a conditioned version
of Lemma 1 (conditioned on W1), and (382) follows, since conditioning reduces differential
entropy.
We also have the following bounds for user 1:
nR1 ≤I(W1; Y
n|W2,Ω) + no(n) (385)
≤I(W1; Y
n, Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n) (386)
=I(W1; Y
n|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (387)
≤h(Y n|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (388)
=h(Y npd, Y
n
dp, Y
n
dd|Z
n,W2,Ω) + h(Y
n
pp|Y
n
pd, Y
n
dp, Y
n
dd, Z
n,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (389)
≤nλpp logP + h(Y
n
dp|Z
n,W2,Ω) + h(Y
n
pd, Y
n
dd|Z
n,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (390)
≤n(λpp + λdp) logP + h(Y
n
pd, Y
n
dd|Z
n,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (391)
59
≤n(λpp + λdp) logP + h(Z
n|W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (392)
where (387) follows since,
I(W1;Z
n|W2,Ω) ≤I(W1;Z
n,W2|Ω) (393)
=I(W1;Z
n|Ω) + I(W1;W2|Z
n,Ω) (394)
≤no(logP ) +H(W2|Z
n,Ω) (395)
≤no(logP ) + no(n), (396)
using the security and reliability constraints. In addition, (392) follows from the conditional
version of Lemma 1 (conditioned on W2).
For receiver 2, we have
nR2 ≤I(W2;Z
n|Ω) + no(n) (397)
=h(Zn|Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n) (398)
=h(Znpp|Z
n
pd, Z
n
dp, Z
n
dd,Ω) + h(Z
n
pd, Z
n
dp, Z
n
dd|Ω)− h(Z
n|W2,Ω) + no(n) (399)
≤nλpp logP + h(Z
n
pd|Ω) + h(Z
n
dp, Z
n
dd|Ω)− h(Z
n|W2,Ω) + no(n) (400)
≤n(λpp + λdp) logP + h(Z
n
dp, Z
n
dd|Ω)− h(Z
n|W2,Ω) + no(n). (401)
In summary, from (384), (392) and (401), we have,
nR1 ≤n logP −
1
2
h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (402)
nR1 ≤n(λpp + λdp) logP + h(Z
n|W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (403)
nR2 ≤n(λpp + λdp) logP + h(Z
n
dp, Z
n
dd|Ω)− h(Z
n|W2,Ω) + no(n). (404)
Eliminating h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|Ω) and h(Z
n|W2,Ω) from these inequalities and taking the limit n→
∞, we arrive at
3R1 +R2 ≤ (2 + 2λpp + 2λdp) logP + o(logP ). (405)
Dividing by logP and taking the limit P →∞, we get the required result
3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λpp + 2λdp. (406)
Appendix D Proof of the s.d.o.f. Region for PD State
In this section, we present the proof for the s.d.o.f. region of the fixed PD state (perfect CSIT
from user 1 and delayed CSIT from user 2). The s.d.o.f. region in this case is given by all
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non-negative pairs (d1, d2) satisfying,
d1 + d2 ≤ 1. (407)
To prove this claim, we first provide a proof of the converse and then two achievable schemes
that are sufficient to achieve the full region.
D.1 Converse
To this end, we create a virtual receiver with output Z˜n with a channel that is statistically
equivalent to user 2. The channel output Z˜ is given by
Z˜(t) = H˜2(t)X(t) + N˜2(t), (408)
where H˜2 and N˜2 are i.i.d. as H2 and N2, respectively. Then, the local statistical equivalence
property implies that
h(Z(t)|Zt−1,W2,Ω) = h(Z˜(t)|Z
t−1,W2,Ω), (409)
where Ω is the set of all channel coefficients upto and including time n. Let us now bound
the rate of user 1:
nR1 ≤I(W1; Y
n|W2,Ω) + no(n) (410)
≤I(W1; Y
n, Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n) (411)
=I(W1; Y
n|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (412)
≤I(W1; Y
n, Z˜n|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (413)
=h(Y n, Z˜n|Zn,W2,Ω)− h(Y
n, Z˜n|Zn,W1,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (414)
≤h(Y n, Z˜n|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (415)
=h(Z˜n|Zn,W2,Ω) + h(Y
n|Zn, Z˜n,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (416)
≤h(Z˜n|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (417)
=
n∑
t=1
h(Z˜(t)|Z˜t−1, Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (418)
≤
n∑
t=1
h(Z˜(t)|Zt−1,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (419)
=
n∑
t=1
h(Z(t)|Zt−1,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (420)
=h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (421)
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where (412) follows since I(W1;Z
n|W2,Ω) ≤ no(logP ) from (393), (417) follows due to the
fact that given Zn and Z˜n, it is possible to reconstruct Xn and hence Y n to within noise
distortion, and (420) follows from (409).
For the second user, we have,
nR2 ≤I(W2;Z
n|Ω) + no(n) (422)
=h(Zn|Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n) (423)
≤n logP − h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n). (424)
Adding (421) and (424), we have,
n(R1 +R2) ≤ n logP + no(logP ) + no(n). (425)
Dividing by n and letting n→∞,
R1 +R2 ≤ logP + o(logP ). (426)
Now dividing by logP and letting P →∞,
d1 + d2 ≤ 1. (427)
This completes the proof of the converse for the case of PD state alone.
D.2 Achievable Schemes
Note that it is sufficient to achieve only two points: a) (d1, d2) = (1, 0) and b) (d1, d2) =
(0, 1). The achievability of these corner points follow in straightforward manner from existing
arguments as follows: sending message to user 1 by superimposing it with artificial noise in a
direction orthogonal to user 1’s channel to achieve the pair (1, 0); and sending the message to
user 2 in a direction orthogonal to user 1’s channel to achieve the pair (0, 1). This completes
the proof of the achievability of the region in (407).
Appendix E Proof of the s.d.o.f. Region for DN State
For the MISO BCCM with the fixed state DN (delayed CSIT from the first user and no
CSIT from the second user), the s.d.o.f. region is given by the set of all non-negative pairs
(d1, d2) satisfying,
d1 + d2 ≤
1
2
. (428)
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To prove this claim, we first provide a proof of the converse and then two achievable schemes
that are sufficient to achieve the full region.
E.1 Converse
We first create a virtual receiver with output Y˜ n with a statistically equivalent channel as
user 1. The channel output Y˜ (t) is given by
Y˜ (t) = H˜1(t)X(t) + N˜1(t), (429)
where H˜1 and N˜1 are i.i.d. as H1 and N1, respectively. Then, the local statistical equivalence
property implies that
h(Y (t)|Y t−1,W1,Ω) = h(Y˜ (t)|Y
t−1,W1,Ω), (430)
where Ω is the set of all channel coefficients upto and including time n. Similar to the proof
of Lemma 1, Appendix B, it can be readily shown that,
2h(Y n|W1,Ω) ≥ h(Z
n|W1,Ω) + o(logP ). (431)
Then, for the first user, we have,
nR1 ≤I(W1; Y
n|Ω)− I(W1;Z
n|Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (432)
=h(Y n|Ω)− h(Y n|W1,Ω)− h(Z
n|Ω) + h(Zn|W1,Ω) (433)
≤h(Y n|Ω)−
1
2
h(Zn|W1,Ω)− h(Z
n|Ω) + h(Zn|W1,Ω) (434)
=h(Y n|Ω) +
1
2
h(Zn|W1,Ω)− h(Z
n|Ω) (435)
≤h(Y n|Ω) +
1
2
h(Zn|Ω)− h(Zn|Ω) (436)
=h(Y n|Ω)−
1
2
h(Zn|Ω), (437)
where (434) follows from (431). For the second user,
nR2 ≤I(W2;Z
n|Ω)− I(W2; Y
n|Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (438)
=h(Zn|Ω)− h(Y n|Ω) + (h(Y n|W2,Ω)− h(Z
n|W2,Ω)) + no(n) + no(logP ). (439)
Adding (437) and (439), we obtain,
n(R1 + R2) ≤
1
2
h(Zn|Ω) + (h(Y n|W2,Ω)− h(Z
n|W2,Ω)) + no(n) + no(logP ) (440)
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≤
n
2
logP + (h(Y n|W2,Ω)− h(Z
n|W2,Ω)) + no(n) + no(logP ). (441)
Thus, in order to obtain d1+d2 ≤ 1/2, it suffices to show that (h(Y n|W2,Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω)) ≤
no(logP ), where the transmitter has delayed CSIT from user 1 and no CSIT from user 2.
To this end, we invoke a recent result in [47, (39)-(66)], which showed that the maximum
of h(Y n|W2,Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω) is less than no(logP ), under the assumption of perfect CSIT
from user 1 and no CSIT from user 2. Hence, the same upper bound on the maximum value
also holds under a weaker assumption of delayed CSIT from user 1. Thus, using the fact
that
(h(Y n|W2,Ω)− h(Z
n|W2,Ω)) ≤ no(logP ), (442)
and substituting in (441), we have,
n(R1 +R2) ≤
n
2
logP + no(n) + no(logP ). (443)
Dividing by n and letting n→∞, we get,
R1 +R2 ≤
1
2
logP + o(logP ). (444)
Dividing by logP and letting P →∞ yields
d1 + d2 ≤
1
2
. (445)
This completes the proof of the converse.
E.2 Achievable Schemes
To prove the achievability of the s.d.o.f. region in (428), it suffices to consider only the two
points: a) (d1, d2) =
(
1
2
, 0
)
and b) (d1, d2) =
(
0, 1
2
)
. Every other point in the region can be
obtained by time-sharing. A scheme for achieving (d1, d2) =
(
1
2
, 0
)
was presented in [43]. We
include it here for completeness.
E.2.1 Scheme Achieving (d1, d2) =
(
1
2
, 0
)
:
We wish to send 1 symbol u securely to the first user in 2 time slots. This can be done as
follows:
1) At time t = 1: The transmitter does not have any channel knowledge. It sends:
X(1) = [q1 q2]
T , (446)
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where q1 and q2 denote independent artificial noise symbols distributed as CN (0, P ). Both
receivers receive linear combinations of the two symbols q1 and q2. The receivers’ outputs
are:
Y (1) = h11(1)q1 + h12(1)q2
∆
= L1(q1, q2) (447)
Z(1) = h21(1)q1 + h22(1)q2. (448)
Due to delayed CSIT from receiver 1, the transmitter can reconstruct L1(q1, q2) in the next
time slot and use it for transmission.
2) At time t = 2: The transmitter sends:
X(2) = [u L1(q1, q2)]
T . (449)
The received signals are:
Y (2) =h11(2)u+ h12(2)L1(q1, q2) (450)
Z(2) =h21(2)u+ h22(2)L1(q1, q2). (451)
Since the receivers have full channel knowledge, receiver 1 can recover u by eliminating
L1(q1, q2) from Y(1) and Y(2). On the other hand, the information leakage to the second
user is given by,
I(u;Z(1), Z(2)|Ω) =h(Z(1), Z(2)|Ω)− h(Z(1), Z(2)|u,Ω) (452)
≤2 logP − h(h21(1)q1 + h22(1)q2, h11(1)q1 + h12(1)q2|Ω) (453)
=2 logP − 2 logP + o(logP ) (454)
=o(logP ). (455)
E.2.2 Scheme Achieving (d1, d2) =
(
0, 1
2
)
:
In this scheme, we wish to send 1 symbol u securely to the second user in 2 time slots. This
can be done as follows:
1) At time t = 1: The transmitter does not have any channel knowledge. It sends:
X(1) = [u q1]
T , (456)
where q denotes an independent artificial noise symbol distributed as CN (0, P ). Both re-
ceivers receive linear combinations of the two symbols u and q. The receivers’ outputs are:
Y (1) = h11(1)u+ h12(1)q
∆
= L(u, q) (457)
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Z(1) = h21(1)u+ h22(1)q
∆
= G(u, q). (458)
Due to delayed CSIT from receiver 1, the transmitter can reconstruct L(u, q) in the next
times lot and use it for transmission.
2) At time t = 2: The transmitter sends:
X(2) = [L(u, q) 0]T . (459)
The received signals are:
Y (2) =h11(2)L(u, q) (460)
Z(2) =h21(2)L(u, q). (461)
Since the receivers have full channel knowledge, receiver 2 can recover u by eliminating q
from L(u, q) and G(u, q). On the other hand, the information leakage to the first user is
given by,
I(u; Y (1), Y (2)|Ω) =I(u;L(u, q)|Ω) (462)
=h(L(u, q)|Ω)− h(L(u, q)|u,Ω) (463)
≤ logP − logP + o(logP ) (464)
=o(logP ). (465)
This completes the proof of achievability.
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